[EM] Approval Voting vs Instant Runoff Voting:

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>Mike wrote:
>
> >As I recently just finished saying here, every pairwise preference that 
>you
>
> >vote in Approval is reliably & fully counted. In what sense, then
> >do you claim that no one's vote counts? Or that the ordinary voter's
> >vote doesn't count?
>
>For a while I've been saying that preferential systems standardise voting
>power, which is important in giving voters an equal say.  Approval does not
>do this.  Here is what I mean;
>
><please note: I'm not arguing that IRV is better than approval, simply that
>I don't find approval acceptable>

Your example below doesn't say what you mean when you say that
every rank-balloting method "standardizes power".

>
>There is a four candidate race.  There may be more than four candidates, 
>but
>only four are "contenders".  The race is very close between all four
>contenders, and opinion polls are neck and neck.
>
>the ballots are
>A 20
>B 14
>C 13
>D 23
>AB 10
>CD 10
>BCD 5
>ABC 5
>
>the results are
>D 38
>A 35
>B 34
>C 33
>
>D is elected with only 38 percent of the vote.  The result is worse than an
>IRV election, in which you can at least be certain that the winner has won
>at least one pairwise contest against another candidate.  In this approval
>election, you could well be electing the Condorcet loser.

Wrong. You've given no information about people's pairwise preferences.

Since, based on the best available information, all the candidates are
about equal, every pair of candidates is equally likely to be the 2
frontrunners. This is a zero-info election. As was just pointed out,
the utility expectation maximizing strategy in this election is to
vote for all the candidates whose utility for the voter is above the
mean of all the candidates. Vote for all the above-average candidates.

But don't complain about the outcome if you don't tell us people's
ratings of the candidates. You haven't really given us an example.

Again, though, you're criticizing Approval because it isn't Condorcet.
Only Condorcet can be Condorcet. Instead of comparing Approval to
Condorcet, compare it to the nonreform that's being pushed so aggressively 
here--IRV.

Yes it's a nice luxury to be able to sincerely rank as many candidates
as you want to, with no strategy fears. Yes it's nice to get compliance
with SFC, GSFC, & SDSC. If what you're saying is that you like Condorcet
better than Approval, then just say so. I too would prefer Condorcet,
for the reasons in this paragraph. But Approval's strategy guarantees,
FBC & WDSC, put it far above anything other than Condorcet.

I guess it would be a race between a democrat, republican, reform
>and then someone even more right wing than that.

You guess pessimistically. Let us have a Nader too. Sure, I'd bullet
vote usually, given the kind of lineup that we usually have here.
Some candidates are absolutely unacceptable, the bought sleazes
promoted by the media. There are also acceptable candidates, none of
whom the media say are winnable. This situation is made-to-order for
Approval: Vote for all the acceptables and for none of the unacceptables.

(In Plurality, vote for the most winnable acceptable).


>The approval example isn't too unrealistic.  It could be worse.

Your Approval "example" isn't an example. It doesn't include enough
information.

Mike Ossipoff


>

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