[EM] Approval Voting vs Instant Runoff Voting:

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

> >Right - and I can't see any case where saying you will vote A not AB
> >will cause B voters to vote AB. I'm sure such a case exists - but I
> >can't find it: hence my question at the end: can you provide one?

Craig's example below really only works if A & B are apparently
equal, as they are in that example, and if there's no reason to
regard one as a compromise with C. That's actually a rare situation
in our public elections. Either there'd be _some_ apparent favoriteness
difference due to polling, or either A would be more of a compromise
with C than B is, or B would be more of a compromise with C than A
is.

So when someone says that A & B voters have a strategy dilemma about
helping or not helping eachother's candidate, they're talking about
a rare special scenario. Even in that improbable scenario, the A
& B voters could somehow confer and come to some understanding about
which probably has more support or is more the compromise with A, even
if polls show A & B exactly equal and there are no published policy
differences between A & B. Failing even that, one must wonder why
A & B are both running. But if they are, then surely their voters are
very similar to eachother, with exactly the same goals, principles
& policy proposals. Then, if there's absolutely no way to judge even
the appearance of possible favoriteness difference or policy difference
that could make one candidate more of a compromise, then these
identical A & B voters should agree to vote for both. Now, someone
might say that, say, the A voters might vote only for A, knowing that
the B voters will help A. Sure, but what happens next time? Then,
there's no chance that the B voters will vote for A, and the A voters
can forget about winning again under those rare conditions.

But I re-emphasize that we're talking about a rare special scenario
that isn't really relevant to our public elections.

Anyway, below I quote Craig's example that I mentioned above.

Mike Ossipoff

>
>Poll with A voters voting AB
>
>AB 30 (A>B>C)
>B 30 (B>A>C)
>C 40
>
>B is projected to win with 60 per cent.
>
>if the A voters say they will vote just A
>A 30
>B 30
>C 40
>
>B voters will vote AB to stop C from winning.
>

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