[EM] Losing with 65% in the Approval Vote

Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Mon May 22 22:10:20 PDT 2000

DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:
> research at ijs.co.nz asked me to forward the below to the EM list.  Responses
> should be directed to him and the EM list.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Here is a better one that is a worst case example of those that aim
>   to make the margin by which a candidate wrong loses, is maximised.
> Candidate A has 65% of the vote and loses in the Approval Vote.
> ------------------
>       AB  32
>       AC  33
>       BC  18
>       CB  17
>    Total = 100
> ------------------
> Approval Vote: A:B:C = 65:67:68, so C wins (65<86 & 67<68) (1 winner).

Such examples are meaningless without some indication of the strengths
of the voters' preferences.  The voters in the above example could
believe that their first and second choices are quite close in
suitability for office, in which case one can argue that voter approval
should in at least some cases override the normal ranked voting

On the other hand, the voters could have an extremely low opinion of
their second choices, in which case the above example is implausible.

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