[EM] Papers can have the last preference filled
research at ijs.co.nz
Wed May 31 02:06:27 PDT 2000
I regard it as a bit of error to send that message to the mailing
list. (1) It is private and by its content it seems so and not about
the EM List especially, and (2) permission would facilitate disclosure
but it was absent [I didn't comment before because I saw no mistake
but it varies by material]. (3) The message is similarly worded to
the one I sent. Now everybody gets to see a draft and not much of
what I wrote to you removed. For what purpose: to show something
about me. I checked it below and I can't find any I-actually-think-talk
which is a ground that I used about you once. (4) It seems to be a
little contrary to your own interests and anyway, an unanalyze and
uninterest clump came into the EM List.
Perhaps I should ask for the reason.
At 09:02 31.05.00 +1000, David Catchpole wrote:
>Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 08:52:37 +1000 (GMT+1000)
>From: David Catchpole <s349436 at student.uq.edu.au>
>To: Craig Carey <research at ijs.co.nz>
>Cc: election-methods-list at egroups.com
>Subject: Re: Ooh... I think he's riled.
>Now, look, (I hate it when media interviewees use that cliche), I don't
>like Approval, but the simple fact is this- Approval is a method that
>restricts expression of preferences to a single comparison of one group of
>candidates with another. That being said, if we are to apply principles of
>voting to the _counting of votes_ without taking account of true utilities
>/ preferences, Pareto efficiency is satisfied. If you were to say that
>somehow this was confounded by the "hidden preferences" of the voters, you
>would need to actually state the assumptions that relate the "hidden
>preferences" to the expressed votes. I know for one thing that if I were
>an A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I voter voting in Approval (as I have-
>interesting side note- Australian Republican Movement Queensland
>has(d) what is effectively an Approval system) without information
>about any other voters I would not be voting ABCDEFGHI, which is simply an
>expression of disinterest same as a blank paper. I would vote
This is a disagreement. There need not be favourite methods. There seems
to be no reason to make decisions like this:
"I am comparing methods A, B, C, D, and E.
You will all agree that because method C is the Approval Vote, these 8
principles, some of which are corollaries, need to be not applied."
You wouldn't want an easy test for your method would you?. I am again
presuming that the end user might be a body that uses scrutinisable
reasoning like tends to be found in government. Let us all scrutinise
the allowing of a weaker test for the Approval Vote [e.g. people get
put in jail for filling in the last preference]. Why a weaker test for
that method alone be needed?. Any ideas David, having just argued for
It is not an obviously trivial issue. For the method to be fixed, an
"if" statement needs to be put into it. Then we might add a discontinuity
in the slopes of surfaces. It will change the method so it needs a new
name. That alteration might destroy proofs that it held good properties.
Also, as ever, voters do not exist in the sense that the set of winners
is affected by them, i.e. the the ballot counts explain 100.0000% of the
outcome of the election. There is nothing left over for the bad-method
advocates to use for their arguments.
Voters average hair length = x (or yet to be thought up by David, or MO).
Voters votes equals vector v
Winners = W(x,v) = W(v)
I don't believe that all the other writers are right to say W has x as
a dependent variable
The derivative of W w.r.t. x is zero.
Do you want to do your argument again. Make you could make it a model
defence of how every other member ought get their "you see, I am an elected
representative, and I know what the voter wants" out into a amthematically
sound form. Once you stop writing about the word voter in pref voting
theory, I will assume you have it figured out.
>ABCDE. Similarly a Catchy-like I>H>G>F>E>D>C>B>A voter would vote
>IHGFE. You could then argue the problem that E won even though 99% of the
>population preferred A. This is a legitimate problem (after all, I devised
>it) (by the way that's not a serious comment, _OK?!_). The one you
>provided was not. I made the assumption that an uninformed voter will fill
>out half or slightly more of the ballot. You didn't make any assumptions
Write down the functions and prove to me that anything about
a voter is relevant to the set of winners, if you can.
The statement you made, which was that the example I provided was not
"legitimate", is a wrong statement. I considered your objection and thought
that using the last preference does not in the slightest weaken the ability
of the example to persuade, if the thinking is on track.
You wrote "I made the assumption that an uninformed voter..".
If he is too uninformed, maybe he ought be excluded from the data collecting
to reduce a source of random errors. However that statistic never gets
considered by the formula.
If you are interested in psychology: why do you and all the other readers
prove so uncomprehending over the true validity of post-hoc motive
ascribing to possibly non-existent voters, a group about which, the method
considers nothing of.
When you use the word voter, it couldn't be replaced with the word "paper".
So you can't be a natural student of preferential voting theory. Maybe more
visualising of things like
"thenewpresidento (voters fave concerns, stuffed ballot 3)"
may help me to not find you erred.
>as to how the choice of vote occurred.
>On Tue, 30 May 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
>> At 10:12 30.05.00 +1000, David Catchpole wrote:
>> >On Tue, 30 May 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
>> >> Thanks David. It makes us all seem so thoughtless. I specifically
>> >> include you now that you said you are not impressed.
>> >What motivated my nasty message is the simple fact that you have
>> >a posititve feature demonstrated by approval voting and most (if not
>> >basically all) methods- Pareto efficiency. In the case you give, 99% of
>> >the population are indifferent between all the candidates. That the other
>> >1% does have an opinion and expresses a preference for J means that the
>> >only preference expressed is that for J. For the election to be Pareto
>> >efficient, J must therefore win. It's quite defensible (and no mention of
>> >"mercurial lions" [W.T.F. ' Y.' T. 'B.?], this time around, please!)
I still do not know what Pareto efficiency is. The very word efficiency
suggests the idea is not worth knowing about.
>> Re Donaldson. I sent in an example suggesting Hare better than Droop.
>Some say the world will end in fire,
>Some say in ice.
>>From what I've tasted of desire
>I hold with those who favour fire.
I prefer air and some water.
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