[EM] 10/27 - David Catchpole and his STV/MMP hybrid

[David Catchpole]

Say for simplicity there are only 3 single-member electorates. There will
therefore be five members in the chamber. Say the candidates for each
single-member electorate are-

NORTH				SOUTH		WEST
Allosaurus (Apple Party)	Anteater (A)	Alan (A)
Brontosaurus (Banana Party)	Beaver (B)	Beatrice (B)
Cephosaurus (Cauliflower Party)	Coelecanth (C)	Catherine (C)

Each voter gets a choice between an abridged ballot form or a full ballot
form- in South, these ballot forms would look like-


(abridged)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ELECTORATE (SOUTH)		|	AT-LARGE		|
[ ] Anteater (Apple)		|	[ ] Apple Party		|
[ ] Beaver (Banana)		|	[ ] Banana Party	|
[ ] Coelecanth (Cauliflower)	|	[ ] Cauliflower Party	|
-----------------------------------------------------------------

(full)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
ELECTORATE (SOUTH)							|
[ ] Anteater (Apple)							|
[ ] Beaver (Banana)							|
[ ] Coelecanth (Cauliflower)						|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT LARGE								|
Apple Party		Banana Party		Cauliflower Party	|
[ ] Allosaurus		[ ] Brontosaurus	[ ] Cephosaur		|
[ ] Anteater		[ ] Beaver		[ ] Coelecanth		|
[ ] Alan		[ ] Beatrice		[ ] Catherine		|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

The order of candidates on the at-large section of the full ballot form is
chosen by parties

Votes at-large on the abridged ballot form are counted such that voting 1
for a party means voting 1-down (to 3 in this case) on the party list,
etc. So an at-large vote on the abridged ballot form of-

[1] A
[2] B
[3] C

represents the equivalent of a vote on the full ballot form of-

A	B	C
[1]	[4]	[7]	
[2]	[5]	[8]
[3]	[6]	[9]

Say that every voter voted precisely the same way at-large (voting
1-to-3 for their favourite party, then 4-to-6 for their next favourite,
etc.) as they did for their electorate, and that the votes were-

NORTH		SOUTH		WEST

51 A>B>C	52 B>A>C	51 C>A>B
20 B>C>A	19 A>C>B	20 A>B>C
29 C>B>A	29 C>A>B	29 B>A>C

So, in North, A has won, in South, B, in West, C.

Now the votes are devalued so that at-large they number-

NORTH		SOUTH		WEST
1 A>B>C		2 B>A>C		1 C>A>B
20 B>C>A	20 A>C>B	20 A>B>C
29 C>B>A	29 C>A>B	29 B>A>C

The quota is 50.

B (Brontosaurus) and C (Cephosaur) get additional at-large seats.

So the resultant composition of the chamber is A, 2B, 2C, from a vote
which on first preferences read: 99 A, 101 B, 109 C

Remember- this is an oversimplification! However, the mechanism of
devaluing votes which contributed to single-member electorate wins to
subtract half of the voters in the electorate, and then considering
at-large votes, remains the same even with different voter turnouts
amongst electorates. (more further down)

On Thu, 28 Oct 1999, Donald E Davison wrote:
> Dear David Catchpole,
>      Tell me if I understand what you have written.
>      Your hybrid will use STV to elect a single member in each district.
> And STV will also be used to determine the order of candidates on the party
> Lists, but it is not clear how that will be done.

Hopefully the example I give above furnishes an answer. It doesn't
establish party list so much as conduct a separate STV election amongst
non-exhausted candidates. (more further down)

>      I am not sure if your `full list of candidates' are only the
> candidates in one district or all the candidates in all the districts
> together. In my hybrid all the district candidates are the list candidates,
> in an order determined by how well each did in their district STV election.
>      I am not sure if your voter has one or two votes. My hybrid only uses
> one vote because it avoids the flaw of overhang members. The number of
> overhang members is increasing in Germany, they had 13 in the last
> election. The parties are getting better at corrupting MMP.

One vote- though it is considered in what can be considered two
separate elections, one of n members using the "electorate" part of the
ballot, and after corresponding devaluation, an election of n-1
members using the "at large" part of the ballot. (more further down)

>     I fail to understand why you are using Meek in the election of only one
> member.

I can't see how you can avoid "overhang members" without a system of
devaluation of voters... (more further down)

> David Catchpole wrote some more:
> The derivation of this which I advocate for my own State house (we're
> unicameral) will probably be a little bit more offensive to you. It
> involves basically everything above, only with a _third_ part of the
> ballot listing parties with "who is your choice to head government?" A
> winner of this third part is found and during the at-large stage voters
> who voted for this winner are counted first, ignoring candidates other
> than those of the winning party and its designated allies, until it (and
> its allies) has a majority of the chamber or votes run out. The rest of
> the at-large seats are then selected as per usual.
> 
> Donald: I approve of the people voting directly for the party to head
> government - that is an improvement - the good in your derivation.
>      I do not approve of your design which will give a majority in the
> House to the party of the Head of Government. You may as well propose no
> election of MPs. Instead the Head of Government will select the MPs - it
> will be the same thing. Why go through the motions of an election, it would
> merely be a French Farce.
>      Why is it so important to you Commonwealth types that the House must
> also be Head of Government? That setup is a conflict of interests.

Well, before we start arguing over whether Montesque was right, or
Montesque was _right_, I'll just (?) leave it at saying that I
believe that the collective system of government of parliamentary systems
is more democatic and less adept at failure than systems of government
which place all executive authority in only one person- and that part of
this belief is rooted in the inherent failures of single-member electoral
systems. Also, I'm stuck with the precedent of a unicameral parliamentary
system which isn't going to drastically change in a hurry. That said, I do
acknowledge that there are severe problems with guaranteeing a majority to
a government and its allies- here's a list of pros and cons...

PROS

* It would guarantee the people's choice of government, and allow the
government to initiate its legislative programme
* In many modern parties (witness NZ1st in New Zealand, One Nation in
Australia), the apparent choice of government or legislation or
legislative ally of their elected members does not reflect the apparent
choice of their voters. In order for the system to still reflect popular
choice, measures have to be put in place which acknowledge who is willing
to go into coalition with who.
* As the thing progressed, people would still be voting amongst parties
that reflected their values and would represent these values in
parliament, but which could be differentiated according to their relations
to other parties and representatives. So, there would be a clear
definition between "Green Left" and "Green Right"

CONS

* It would guarantee a virtual stranglehold of the executive over
legislative matters (as if it wouldn't have one anyway ;>) 
* It assumes that parties and their voters are not flexible in their
support for a government, and it reduces the possibility of a minority or
coalition government accountable to other parties and representatives
which are likely to change their allegiance if not widely satisfied.
* It might fail to accurately represent support for parties and the
values which they stood for in the community.

Perhaps it would be slightly less offensive if the system guaranteed just
short of a majority for the allies who would form government- so that the
mandate was there and only one or a few extra supporters would need to be
found to have a majority in the chamber, but there would still be a better
degree of the instability (not always a nasty word) and diversity in a
parliament that make PR so really effective in places. (more further
down)

>      Your plan would deny representation to as many people as necessary in
> order that the Head party could have a majority in the House - that is
> corruption.

Well, not the head party, but the head party and parties which have
indicated they will ally with it... So absolute power and corruption are
not quite so implicit and responsibility for them gets spread around
according to how corrupt in aggregate the allies are. Do you notice how
the worst corruption occurs in systems with a separately elected
executive? I believe this is because (partly) of the fact that rather than
simply being responsible in 3,4, or 5-year cycles, parliamentary
governments have to stay on their toes under the constant scrutiny of an
opposition and the government's own allies and members.

>      Absolute power is an old concept in government, but it is still alive
> and doing well today. You have old ideas. There was an English Lord that
> had something to say about power and absolute power.

Speaking of Lords...

>      A `little bit more offensive' is an understatement. I am very offended
> by this power grab that you propose.

I could say "Awright!" at the moment, but it wouldn't really reflect the
fact that I'm not looking for a power grab (and though I like offending
people, I would rather they liked me, obscene, stubborn little moron that
I am). Think of it as pushing the envelope, per se?

> 
>      The best system of government will be the system that invites everyone
> to the table to form government policy. You are a long ways from that
> concept of thinking.

I disagree, but I'll agree to disagree.

>      You should join the new wave of thinking about government.
>      There is no need for you to be old before your time.

If the "new wave of thinking" is corporatism(consensus)-at-all-costs a'la 
Mussolini and the Australian Democrats, I'm afraid I'm going to stay
prematurely old, haggard radical-democratic cooperativist market socialist
that I am.