Head to Head Comparison of Election Methods
Ron Tannenwald
rtannenwald at UMASSD.EDU
Mon May 24 09:29:25 PDT 1999
>I suggest a separate YES/NO vote on each choice since I do not think that
>many voters would understand a ballot with "No choice" (sometimes called
>"None of the Above" (NOTA)) such as--
>
>A
>B
>C
>NOTA
>
>Thus, I suggest that a sample ballot be something like --
>
> YES NO RANK
>A x 5
>B x 2
>C x 4
>D x 1
>E x 3
>
>Only the choices having a YES majority (absolute votes) would go head to head
>using the RANK votes (relative votes).
>
>If there is no Condorcet winner, then the choice with the most YES votes
>would win (for a single winner election).
>
>The public would have to undergo some major education about head to head math.
>
I think Dumais' method is very interesting and has many virtues,but
simplicity
is not one of them.I fully agree that the "winner" should have majority
approval
from the electorate.It is assumed that ballot truncation is a strategic
ploy and
that the voter has no preference among the candidates omitted,hence the
remaining points are distributed equally.But ballot truncation may be the
voter's way of expressing disapproval of those truncated.Assume,for a moment,
this to be the case and consider the following example:
20% 20% 39% 21%
--- --- --- ---
A A B C
B C
C B
Most of the familiar methods (Plurality,Instant Runoff,Condorcet ,and
Dumais)
would declare A the victor. Candidate A has only 40% approval. Candidate B has
nearly the number of first place tallies,79% approval, and is the first or
second choice of 59%.If a winner is to be annointed I think it should be B.
I am NOT a fan of Approval Voting.It was first proposed in the decade after
Arrow's famous result appeared.It is simple (to understand and implement) and
technically is independent of irrelevant alternatives which seems to set it
apart from all ranking methods.Its main proponent Professor Steven Brams of
NYU
writes research articles which purport to mathematically prove its superiority
under the assumption that voter's feelings about candidates are
dichotomous. This hypothesis is preposterous! No voter's attitudes about
candidates are dichotomous.I would approve of Prof. Brams in a two-way race
against an Adolf
Hitler and not approve of him in a two-way contest against an Honest Abe
Lincoln. Furthermore,if my favored candidate withdrew from the race I might
very
well change my non-approval of another to approval;so,in actuality,this
method is not independent of irrelevant alternatives.Approval Voting
violates
the majority criterion (sometimes dramatically).To overcome this major
shortcoming voters are forced to employ strategies that hide their true
feelings.Simplicity is about the only thing in its favor(but Plurality
Voting is
even simpler.)
To justify my choice of a voting procedure let me set forth some criteria
I feel are necessities.
1.Majority Criteria (i.e. if a candidate is the first choice of a majority,
that candidate wins)
2.The winner must have the approval of a majority of voters.
3.The method should be simple to explain,understand,and implement.
With the understanding that no method is ideal,my preference would be
Bucklin voting with the proviso that should no candidate receive majority
approval the election is void and no present candidate can run in the new
election.
Bucklin voting is certainly simple and has been used
historically;voters immediately saw that their lower choices might hurt
their favorites(a property common to most ranking systems without
elimination, but not so obvious) and so many voted bullets.The second part
of my scheme is meant to discourage strategic
truncation of ballots.Voters do so now at their peril.
Respectfully,
.
Ronald Tannenwald
Chairperson, Mathematics Department
UMass Dartmouth
North Dartmouth MA, 02747
(508) 999-8746
Fax: 508-910-6917
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