Mike Ositoff ntk at
Wed Oct 7 13:40:22 PDT 1998

 This continues my reply to the remarks that equated majority
rule to Nazi rule.

For one thing, the extreme or dangerous groups are unlikely to
have a majority, though it could happen. But more often majority
rule is a moderating influence. And so it's highly misleading
to identify the majority with people who want to put people
in gas ovens.

As I said, one reason why majority rule is important to me is
that a majority can get its way anyway, regardless of the method.
It can do so by strategy. IRO & Margins require the kind of
strategy that I call drastic defensive strategy. Several
people agree with me that it's desirable for a voting system
to encourage honest voting. Then it's especially desirable
for a method to not force the especially insincere practice
of voting a less-liked alternative equal to or over a more
liked one, in a ranking election. Do you really want more than
half the voters to have to play strategy games, and rank
Clinton above Nader, even though they like Nader best?
Just in case you're part of that more-than-half, as you
would be if Nader voters + Clinton voters add up to a majority,
wouldn't it be best not to impose drastic strategy requirements
on majority-size groups? We can avoid that with the VA methods.

But with Approval we can at least avoid the need to vote
Clinton _over_ Nader, as you'd often need to do with IRO or


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