Exaggerated opinions

Saari Saari at aol.com
Wed Apr 22 02:01:51 PDT 1998


In a message dated 98-04-21 09:45:58 EDT, you write:

<< > Example#2.  This is a method I'm exploring right now.  Same system as
above,
 > but suppose that double-votes, triple-votes, etc. are also allowed.  But
there
 > is a cost.  A double-vote costs $1 for each instance.  A triple-vote costs
 > $10.  A quadruple-vote costs $100.  All money collected goes into a common
 > pool which is routinely split evenly among all of the participants.
 
 I hope we are not talking real money here! I would not vote for such 
 a scheme. >>

OK, you wouldn't vote "Support".  Would you vote "Neutral" or would you vote
"Opposed"?

If opposed, I would be interested to hear your reason why.  For the commonest
objection - "This gives an advantage to rich people." I would point out that
such a scheme will cause a net flow of money from people with too much money
toward people who are more frugal for whatever reason.

For example, suppose a proposal gets 5 supporters and 3 opponents.  It fails
because it did not achieve the required 5:1 support/oppose ratio.  If one
supporter opts for a quadruple-support vote (for a $100 fee) the tally is
still only 8 supporters vs 3 opponents and it still fails.  Note that each
participant is now about $10 richer because of the foolish excessive support
by an obviously too-rich member.

The whole system "looks" like a capitalistic "the rich get their way" system
but it really won't work that way at all.

As a further example, suppose ALL FIVE supporters are rich and willing to cast
$100 quadruple-votes.  The tally is now 20 support vs. 3 opponents - greater
than the required 5:1.  Note, however, that it only takes two double-oppose
votes ($1 each) or one triple-oppose vote ($10) to bring the tally to 20
support vs. 5 opponents = fails.

The net result is that it in fact is impractical to "buy" an outcome under
this method.  All you can really do is perhaps double-vote on an issue where
the $1 cost is trivial compared to HOW YOU REALLY FEEL.  This is the whole
point - to allow different expressions of degree of feeling while designing
out the tendency to overexaggerate.

>I for one would always give my preferred option the highest rating 
>even if I thought that the issue affected some other voters more.
>It seems to me that voters like me will affect the outcome more than 
>those who take account of their strength of preference.

Under my proposed example system this won't work for two reasons:

1) With the "pay for extra strength" method described earlier, there is no
such thing as a "highest rating" therefore no tendency to vote that way.

2) Remember that each option is posted as a separate proposal.  Suppose all
existing proposals on a topic are either poor or only "ok" at best.  You say
you would "vote the maximum" on the best of the lot.  But under this system
there is nothing to prevent other, possibly-better options from being
"discovered" and proposed further down the road.  Your premature "maximum"
vote on a proposal that was only "ok" means that, if a later proposal appears
really outstanding to you, your "maximum" vote on the new, later proposal will
be indistinguishable from your previous, premature "maximum" vote on one that
was really not that noteworthy.

Also, an excessive "maximum" vote on an "ok" proposal increases the likelihood
that it will pass, when you might prefer if EVERY current proposal fails -
thus boosting the chances of a newer, better proposal.

To protect your interests, then, you would do well to consider NOT casting a
"maximum" vote (if there is one) on any proposal that does not truly reflect
your interests.

The "all or nothing" mentality is tempting, to be sure.  And it is actually
encouraged by some voting/scoring systems.  But not this one.

Mike Saari



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