Exaggerated opinions

David Marsay djmarsay at dra.hmg.gb
Wed Apr 22 08:13:01 PDT 1998


In reply to:

> From:          Saari <Saari at aol.com>
> Date:          Wed, 22 Apr 1998 05:01:51 EDT
> Subject:       Re: Exaggerated opinions

> << > Example#2.  This is a method I'm (MIKE) exploring right now.  Same system as
> above,
>  > but suppose that double-votes, triple-votes, etc. are also allowed.  But
> there
>  > is a cost.  A double-vote costs $1 for each instance.  A triple-vote costs
>  > $10.  A quadruple-vote costs $100.  All money collected goes into a common
>  > pool which is routinely split evenly among all of the participants.
>  
>  I (DAVID) hope we are not talking real money here! I would not vote for such 
>  a scheme. >>
> 
> (MIKE) OK, you wouldn't vote "Support".  Would you vote "Neutral" or would you vote
> "Opposed"?

I would be opposed, but open to persuasion!

Suppose that there are a series of votes, as in general elections. 
You are proposing a game, in which voters can spend money or not. The 
interesting case is where there is a rich minority that 
can buy the result unless the poor majority spend.

If neither spend, the effect is neutral. If both spend then, under 
your rules, the poor gain. If the poor spend but the rich do not 
then the rich gain. If the rich only spend then the rich win. 

It seems to me that the rich should should spend or not spend 
as a block, with a sufficiently small random probability p for each 
election. Then either the rich eventually win or they bleed the poor 
dry, at which point, presumably, they win anyway.
 
> >I (DAVID) for one would always give my preferred option the highest rating 
> >even if I thought that the issue affected some other voters more.
> >It seems to me that voters like me will affect the outcome more than 
> >those who take account of their strength of preference.

I was thinking here of a typical ballot with a fixed number of 
options and no side payments.

You describe a situation under which voters are faced with an 
indefinite stream of proposals to rate, and so may want to hold 
maximum assent/dissent in reserve. I am currently neutral to your 
suggestion in this context. However, it seems to me that I would want 
to be able to estimate just how brilliant or obnoxious future 
proposals might be in order that I would know when to declare 
'maximum' assent/dissent. That is, the difficulty you raise with 
respect to exaggeration is also a difficulty - at least to me - in 
any case.

Cheers.
--------------------------------------------------
Sorry folks, but apparently I have to do this. :-(
The views expressed above are entirely those of the writer
and do not represent the views, policy or understanding of
any other person or official body.



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