[EM] Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Mike Ossipoff dfb at bbs.cruzio.com
Mon Mar 4 18:12:59 PST 1996

Matthew Shugart writes:
> At 10:09 AM 3/1/96, Rob Lanphier wrote:
> >On Fri, 1 Mar 1996, Mike Ossipoff wrote:
> >> I've already said what standards I consider important: Getting rid
> >> of the lesser-of-2-evils problem & protecting majority rule, &
> >> eliminating the need for defensive strategy. I've told why Condorcet's
> >> method meets these standards. Does anyone disagree with those standards?
> Yes.

Sorry. Merely saying that you disagree with a standard isn't enough.
If you don't say why you disagree, then all you're telling us is
that you don't mind the lesser-of-2-evils problem, that you don't
mind if voters need to use defensive strategy under ordinary conditions,
and that you don't care about majority rule. 

> >> Does anyone propose another standard that he believes is more important?
> The system shouldbe easy to understand (Condorcet is not), and should not

In other words you want to dumb it down, because you believe that voters
won't understand it. Is it that you believe rank-balloting is too 
complicated for voters? I've mentioned it to lots of people and gotten
only enthusiastic responses to it. Someone recently posted:
"If you can count, you can vote [by rank-balloting]"

Or is it just that Condorcet's count rule is too complicated? Ok,
which part is too complicated? I claim that Condorcet's method is
no more complicated than Double-Complement.

Electoral reformers are very familiar with the objection to genuine
electoral reform that says "It's too complicated". That should be
for the voters themselves to decide--or would that conflict with
your opposition to majority rule?

> be thought of as producing a clear "map" of what people think, but in

Re-check the standards that I listed. There's nothing there about
"producing a map".

> decisively electing a head of government from anong identifiable
> alternatives.  That is what a presidential election is for, ultimately.

Ok, so it's that you believe that Condorcet's method will choose between
unidentifiable alternatives. Or perhaps that it won't choose between
alternatives if they are indentifiable. Clarification??

And how would a method indecisively elect a head of govt? By not
making a choice??

If your only standards are that the method be able to decisively
pick a winner from a set of "identifiable" alternatives, then I'd
say that your standards are mighty lax. But that's ok. They don't
conflict with my standards, and only mean that you'd accept lots
of methods, including Plurality, which I wouldn't accept. And which
no electoral reformer would accept.

Mike Ossipoff

> *****************************************
> Matthew Shugart
> Associate Professor of Political Science
> Address:
> Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
> University of California, San Diego
> 9500 Gilman Drive
> La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
> Phone:  619-534-5016
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