Demorep1: Truncation. Approval.

[Steve Eppley]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com
-snip-
>I raise the elementary question-- what is an alleged typical real
>election result using plain Condorcet with 3 candidates ? 
>With 4 candidates ?
>With 5 candidates ?
>
>How many times would a plain Condorcet winner in a real election
>beat each other candidate by a majority of all the voters (such as
>52 to 48, not 47 to 43)? 

What was the point of the simulations you recently performed, if not 
to answer that kind of question?

I disagree with Demorep's assessment that it's "extremely unlikely"
people will reject a system based on minimizing opposition when it's 
compared with the existing Plurality system--which elects candidates
which are opposed by a majority.  I suspect the opposite assessment
is correct.

Whether or not Demorep agrees that the best method wouldn't allow
voters to express absolute disapproval, what seems important is
whether the proposed reform will be significantly superior to the
status quo Plurality without inciting (well-funded) controversy that
in some way(s) the reform will be worse than the status quo.  The 
life-or-death "Hitler vs. Stalin" scenarios Demorep has offered to 
scare us away from plain (or Smith-) Condorcet are even worse when
the method is Plurality, so I don't see that they'd be useful in
attacking Condorcet in a head to head campaign between Condorcet 
and the status quo.  An obvious reply to those bogus attacks:

  Vote for only one, plurality wins       Condorcet
  ---------------------------------       --------------
   35 Hitler                              35 Hitler, Attila
   33 Stalin                              33 Stalin, Hitler
   32 Attilla the Hun                     32 Attila, Stalin
   ==> With either method, Evil wins if Good doesn't compete.

   35 Hitler                              35 Hitler
   33 Washington                          33 Washington,Eisenhower
   32 Eisenhower                          32 Eisenhower,Washington
   ==> Evil wins if Good fragments.       ==> No Fragmentation.

Here's a question for Demorep.  Suppose the voters:
  1) majority-approve A,
  2) majority-disapprove B, and
  3) majority-prefer B more than A.
Should A be elected because B is disapproved, or should B be elected
because B is preferred more than A?  Here's an example which
illustrates this possibility:
  46: A/B
  10: BA/
  10: B/A
  34: /BA
(The symbol '/' demarcates the voter's approval/disapproval 
threshold.)

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)