Demorep1: Truncation. Approval.

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Thu Dec 12 19:17:14 PST 1996


Mr. Eppley wrote:

Here's a question for Demorep.  Suppose the voters:
  1) majority-approve A,
  2) majority-disapprove B, and
  3) majority-prefer B more than A.
Should A be elected because B is disapproved, or should B be elected because
B is preferred more than A?  Here's an example which illustrates this
possibility:
  46: A/B
  10: BA/
  10: B/A
  34: /BA
(The symbol '/' demarcates the voter's approval/disapproval 
threshold.)
----
Demorep1 writes:
A is disapproved by 44 of 100.  B is disapproved by a mere 80 of 100.  A wins
without having to go head to head with B.  A disapproval vote means that a
candidate is unacceptable to be elected by that voter.  Perhaps a more
acceptable candidate might come along who is tolerable to the very unhappy 34
: /BA voters.

The winners in all of the simulations got majorities which of course is not
real since there may be massive truncations as I shown in many examples in
which the leading first choice candidates will start suggesting/dictating
additional choices (if any). The way to defeat Plurality (i.e. minority rule)
is to require majority rule for executive and judicial offices.




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