Demorep1: Truncation. Approval.
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Thu Dec 12 19:17:14 PST 1996
Mr. Eppley wrote:
Here's a question for Demorep. Suppose the voters:
1) majority-approve A,
2) majority-disapprove B, and
3) majority-prefer B more than A.
Should A be elected because B is disapproved, or should B be elected because
B is preferred more than A? Here's an example which illustrates this
possibility:
46: A/B
10: BA/
10: B/A
34: /BA
(The symbol '/' demarcates the voter's approval/disapproval
threshold.)
----
Demorep1 writes:
A is disapproved by 44 of 100. B is disapproved by a mere 80 of 100. A wins
without having to go head to head with B. A disapproval vote means that a
candidate is unacceptable to be elected by that voter. Perhaps a more
acceptable candidate might come along who is tolerable to the very unhappy 34
: /BA voters.
The winners in all of the simulations got majorities which of course is not
real since there may be massive truncations as I shown in many examples in
which the leading first choice candidates will start suggesting/dictating
additional choices (if any). The way to defeat Plurality (i.e. minority rule)
is to require majority rule for executive and judicial offices.
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