[EM] 2nd Lomax reply

[Michael Ossipoff]

Lomax says:

Nevertheless, Warren has a point. He states conclusion based on thin 
evidence, yes. But he does this when there, essentially, is *no* other 
evidence.

I reply:

No, not really. There is evidence that no one here proposes Condorcet 
without equal rankings. Strong evidence, in fact. Based on that strong 
evidence, Warren’s simulation (so far at least) has no relevance for 
Condorcet as proposed here.

Maybe Lomax is new here, but others have done simulations of Condorcet and 
simulations of RV. Warren is not a pioneer by doing that, Mr. Lomax. Maybe, 
however, he’s the first to do a simulation which assumes that voters will 
vote equally sincerely in Condorcet and RV, and will not vote equal 
rankings.

Lomax continues:

In this particular field, we have a whole lot of theory that is not grounded 
in either real elections *or* simulations.

I reply:

…and we have simulations that are not grounded in reality.

Guarantees about what a method will or may not do may sound too theoretical 
to Lomax, who seems skeptical about :”a whole lot of theory”. But provable 
statements about what a method will or won’t do have real application and 
relevance more real than a simulation. Certainly more real than a simulation 
based on false premises.

Lomax continues:


Most of the methods we favor have either never been tried, or they have been 
tried only in very limited circumstances. Warren's simulations are limited, 
yes. But they are all we have.

I reply:

I don’t know where Mr. Lomax has been, but others have done simulations of 
single-winner methods, including Condorcet and RV.

Lomax continues:


Mr. Lomax likes to post very long and rambling messages. I’m only replying 
to a few statements.

Lomax continues:

With pure ranked methods, order reversal is necessary, but with ranked 
methods which allow equal ranking, strategic voters *can* avoid order 
reversal. But then they are voting exactly as they would with Range!

I reply:

…except that defensive equal ranking is only needed if there’s a threat of 
order-reversal. A threat of order-reversal that hasn’t been deterred by the 
possibility of the easy and natural punitive countermeasure, defensive 
truncation.

Lomax continues:

>How does a voter decide whether to rank equally, assuming the method 
> >permits this? That is up to the voter, who will sometimes see two 
> >candidates as equally worthy and then be thankful for being able to >vote 
>accordingly. Absolutely. Look, the point was that allowing equal ranking 
>can be expected to improve election outcomes as measured by Bayesian 
>Regret. Sure, voters may use it to indicate equal approval, but what is 
>more interesting here is how strategic voters will use it, if they wish to 
>avoid downranking their favorite. With equal ranking allowed, they can use 
>Approval strategy.

I reply::

Mr. Lomax, you haven’t really examined Condorcet strategy, have you.

among these lost. If one really wants absolute, 100%, full vote strength, 
doesn't want to chance that even one thousandth of a vote could flip the 
outcome, then Range ballots could provide a means of indicating ranking with 
equal rating. But the question is whether or not this would provide a 
significant benefit to society? I'd suggest that considering elections from 
the point of view of utility leads us to conclude that it would not provide 
any measurable benefit. Personally, I'd like to encourage voters to vote 
sincerely. Sincere Range maximizes utility precisely because it sums 
expressions of utility from each voter. The only question is the behavior of 
Range under conditions of insincere, strategic voting, and there is a huge 
amount of hot air on this subject. And only one person who has studied it in 
a more grounded way. Warren Smith.

I reply:

…but gounded in what?

Lomax continues:


Note that, if I am correct, Condorcet himself received criticism of his 
method based on a comment about strategic voting. He dismissed it, saying 
that his method was for honest voters.

I reply:

You are not correct. That was de Borda, the initial proponent of Borda’s 
method. I believe that it was Condorcet who point out to de Borda the 
strategy problems of Borda’s method.


What is the ideal method for honest voters? I'd say that if we can't agree 
on that, we aren't even going to get close to agreement about what is best 
when voters opt to vote strategically. For reasons that I won't detail at 
this time, though, my expectation is that Range will behave well in the 
presence of strategic voting. Any significant harm done is likely to fall 
upon the strategic voters, not on the honest ones.

I reply:

Justification for that statement?

What was it that Lomax said about hot air?

Sincere RV voters will be had by strategic voters. And no, that doesn’t 
require a simulation.

Mike Ossipoff