[EM] RE : Re: RE : Majority Criterion, hidden contradictions

[Chris Benham]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>At 01:30 AM 11/7/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>  
>
>>Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>90: A9>B1    (sincere is A9>B1)
>>10: B99>A0  (sincere is B5>A3)
>>
>>All the voters have a sincere low opinion of both candidates, but 
>>90% think that A is 900%
>>better than B and yet B wins (with only 10% of the voters not being 
>>"sincere and honest").
>>    
>>
>
>It is almost as if Chris said, there are 100 eligible voters. 90 of 
>them stay home. 10 vote and the candidate they favor is elected.
>
>Chris has assumed that a sincere Range vote would be an absolute 
>number. Range votes are *relative* (just like other votes, 
>generally). There is no intrinsic meaning to 99 or 0, beyond saying 
>that 99 is "the best" and 0 is "the worst."
>
>If voters do not choose a "best" and a "worst," i.e., vote 99 or 0 
>for at least one candidate each, they have cast a weak vote. Casting 
>a maximum vote of 9 out of a possible 99 is like casting one-tenth of a vote.
>  
>
CB: I was directly responding to

>However, what is being said is that if 
>people use Range sincerely and honestly, Range will maximize expected 
>value, summed over all the voters.
>
Perhaps you can clarify your meaning of the phrase "expected value"?

>
> Voters are not required to 
>satisfy any definition of preference strength under Range. They may 
>express what we might call a weak preference as strong, and they may, 
>but are unlikely to do so, express a strong preference as weak (I see 
>no reason why they would do this)
>  
>
>Lying, in the meaning I was using would be to reverse the actual 
>preference. I.e., we are talking about strategic voting, *not* merely 
>voting Approval style. The voter prefers B to C, but prefers A to be 
>and fears that B will win unless the voter ranks B at minimum. The 
>lie is not that the voter ranks B at minimum, but that the voter then 
>ranks C higher than B even though the preference is the opposite.
>  
>
So now a Range vote is strategic only if  it reverses a sincere 
preference? On 29/10/06 you wrote:

> In 0-99 Range, with Gore vs Nader vs Bush, they would probably be 
> advised to vote Nader 99,
> Gore 98, Bush 0. If they were going to vote strategically. Otherwise 
> they just vote sincerely and
> let the chips fall where they may. But that strategic vote would still 
> express a preference for Nader,..


>
>  
>
>>We can certainly be sure majoritarian methods will outperform  Range 
>>in the worst-case scenarios.
>>    
>>
>
>Provocative statement made with utterly no evidence presented.
>
That is because it is obvious to everyone on this list with a clue, 
while Abd has shown himself to be immune
to even clear simple proofs.


Chris Benham

> 
>
>  
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