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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061107212143.02174038@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 01:30 AM 11/7/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
90: A9>B1 (sincere is A9>B1)
10: B99>A0 (sincere is B5>A3)
All the voters have a sincere low opinion of both candidates, but
90% think that A is 900%
better than B and yet B wins (with only 10% of the voters not being
"sincere and honest").
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
It is almost as if Chris said, there are 100 eligible voters. 90 of
them stay home. 10 vote and the candidate they favor is elected.
Chris has assumed that a sincere Range vote would be an absolute
number. Range votes are *relative* (just like other votes,
generally). There is no intrinsic meaning to 99 or 0, beyond saying
that 99 is "the best" and 0 is "the worst."
If voters do not choose a "best" and a "worst," i.e., vote 99 or 0
for at least one candidate each, they have cast a weak vote. Casting
a maximum vote of 9 out of a possible 99 is like casting one-tenth of a vote.
</pre>
</blockquote>
CB: I was directly responding to<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">However, what is being said is that if
people use Range sincerely and honestly, Range will maximize expected
value, summed over all the voters.</pre>
</blockquote>
Perhaps you can clarify your meaning of the phrase "expected value"?<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061107212143.02174038@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite"><br>
<pre wrap=""> Voters are not required to
satisfy any definition of preference strength under Range. They may
express what we might call a weak preference as strong, and they may,
but are unlikely to do so, express a strong preference as weak (I see
no reason why they would do this)
</pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061107212143.02174038@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
Lying, in the meaning I was using would be to reverse the actual
preference. I.e., we are talking about strategic voting, *not* merely
voting Approval style. The voter prefers B to C, but prefers A to be
and fears that B will win unless the voter ranks B at minimum. The
lie is not that the voter ranks B at minimum, but that the voter then
ranks C higher than B even though the preference is the opposite.
</pre>
</blockquote>
So now a Range vote is strategic only if it reverses a sincere
preference? On 29/10/06 you wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">In 0-99 Range, with Gore vs Nader vs Bush, they
would probably be advised to vote Nader 99, <br>
Gore 98, Bush 0. If they were going to vote strategically. Otherwise
they just vote sincerely and <br>
let the chips fall where they may. But that strategic vote would still
express a preference for Nader,..</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061107212143.02174038@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">We can certainly be sure majoritarian methods will outperform Range
in the worst-case scenarios.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Provocative statement made with utterly no evidence presented.</pre>
</blockquote>
That is because it is obvious to everyone on this list with a clue,
while Abd has shown himself to be immune <br>
to even clear simple proofs.<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061107212143.02174038@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
</blockquote>
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