44bjm at home.com
Thu Apr 26 15:55:29 PDT 2001
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Richard Moore wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote:
> > If I understand correctly, this tactic will neither help nor hinder
> > our
> > friends. It will not hinder our friends because the method is
> > monotonic.
> > It will not help our friends, because you cannot fool the system by
> > putting in insincere utilities.
> More precisely, you cannot fool the system into giving you better
> results, but
> you could always fool it into giving you worse results (e.g., by
> reversing some
> of your preferences). But yes, I think your statement is correct with
> > Another thing. It seems to me that if Cranor advised me to approve
> > AB
> > but the election went to E (skipping over C and D), I would be
> > pretty
> > upset, especially if it turned out that everyone voted precisely as
> > advised by Cranor.
> > Therefore I assume that once Cranor figures out that E is going to
> > win,
> > she is going to advise me approve down to E.
> I'm not sure. If E and G are front runners, and you like E better,
> then probably
> so. I think the central program needs to be making a probabilisitic
> rather than
> a deterministic prediction. One way it could do this is by only
> sampling the inputs to make the next prediction. Then it never
> "figures out that
> E is going to win", or at least if it does it doesn't feed this fact
> back to the
> individual strategizers. All the individual strategizers should see is
> a matrix
> of probabilities calculated by the central algorithm.
> > Whether I am advised to
> > approve E itself or not would depend on whether my (faction's ?)
> > failure
> > to support E would result in someone I considered below E winning.
> > Suppose that E is destined to win (if everyone votes their optimum
> > strategy) and that everyone who is advised to vote down to and
> > including E
> > follows that advice, but that the other folks rebel and refuse to
> > vote
> > down to just above E. Then E would still have to win, because no
> > other
> > candidate increases in approval.
> I agree with that analysis.
> On the other hand, if some of the "including E" voters foolishly try
> to fool
> the system, it could backfire on them. They will either increase
> support for
> another candidate, or reduce support for E, or have no effect at all.
> would this result in a candidate they like better than E getting
> elected, unless
> the system's original prediction about E was inaccurate in the first
> place. If
> a enough of these voters actually preferred C to E for this strategy
> to work,
> then it seems unlikely the system would have projected E in the first
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