[EM] Unranked-IRV, Cumulative, and Normalized Ratings

LAYTON Craig Craig.LAYTON at add.nsw.gov.au
Sun Apr 22 17:08:16 PDT 2001

Wouldn't such a system always converge on the Condorcet winner?  I am also
guessing that where there isn't a Condorcet winner, you would have to
identify some stopping point or the personal computers may keep submitting
ballots indefinately.  I'm picturing those little chaos theory diagrams with
the blue and red dots - the dots never settle on just one colour, they keep
changing forever.

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Moore [mailto:rmoore4 at home.com]
Sent: Sunday, 22 April 2001 6:11
To: Forest Simmons
Cc: Election Methods
Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked-IRV, Cumulative, and Normalized Ratings

I understand the question and it does seem paradoxical. Since I don't know
the details about the method I can only speculate.

Imagine that each voter is given a computer which is running a standard
of software that implements a standard strategy algorithm. The software
takes a voter's ratings input and runs it through the strategizer, which
calculates the voter's ideal approval ballot based on current statistical
information (initially a zero-info strategy). The result is forwarded to
a central computer which counts the votes and then predicts the likelihood
of various outcomes in the next round. This could be done by treating the
current round as a statistical sampling, for instance. The information is
sent back to the voters' computers, which then adjust their approval
ballots, and the process is repeated until a winner is converged upon.

If I were to give my computer insincere ratings, I am in effect claiming
to be a better strategizer than the system is. If instead I give it sincere
ratings, I am trusting the system to be a better strategizer than I am.
Since the strategizing software is continuously making adaptations to
the political environment, as reported by the central computer, I suspect
that I would be wrong to think I could do a better job.

Also, I don't think such a system would perfectly maximize utilities, but
would do as good a job as Approval would do if all voters voted optimum
Approval strategy. So the system is more of a "strategy assistant" to the
voters than it is a "result optimizer". Plus, the system could also collect
the presumably sincere ratings after the fact to determine how strong the
winner's mandate really is (in an SU sense, that is).


Forest Simmons wrote:

This is more of a query about Lori Cranor's method than anything else.If it
really gives no strategic incentive for distorting ratings, itsounds like
the ideal way to use CR ballots.Here's what puzzles me. On the one hand, it
seems like any method like MsCranor's that uses CR ballots to formulate
optimal Approval Strategiesshould be able to do so in a way that would give
the win to the candidatewith the greatest average rating.If that is the
case, then it seems like any strategy that would improvethe average rating
of your favorite on the CR ballot would be tempting. Inother words, one
would be tempted to distort ratings. On the other hand, if the method
doesn't give the win to a maximally ratedcandidate, then it probably isn't
much better than plain old Approval insocial utility.Can you shed any light!
 on this?Forest

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