[EM] Some brief campaign argument (Approval)

Martin Harper mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk
Sat Apr 21 16:02:25 PDT 2001


> I would like to emphasise that I don't think Approval is a terrible method.
> I actually think it is very good for non-political elections, and certainly
> better than Plurality, IRV, Cardinal Ratings, Borda &c. for political
> elections (except in the case of two very strong candidates and a bunch of
> frivolous candidates, where IRV might be marginally better, but IRV does so
> much worse in any other situation that I don't believe it is a good
> proposal).

I would have thought that this would be a case were Approval works 
especially well: provided people realise which candidates are strong and 
which are frivolous, a sincere vote which approves one of the 
frontrunners and disapproves the other will suffice.

That said, all election methods work well in that case: even IRV - it's 
the tricky cases which are more important...

FFrom election-methods-list-request at eskimo.com  Sat Apr 21 18:44:51 2001
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From: DEMOREP1 at aol.com
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Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2001 21:42:48 EDT
Subject: RE: Voting on matters of pure fact
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Mr. Simmons wrote in part---

It's an interesting question -- is it meaningful to vote on a
pure matter of objective fact?  Whatever the answer to that
question, I think a more practical question is:  does it
affect the choice of election method.
----
D- Functional laws operate as follows-

If such and such fact exists, then a person [shall, shall not, may] do such 
and such.   [criminal punishment and/or civil remedy].

With many anytime and anyplace *absolute* criminal laws the if clause is 
dropped (or the crime is made part of the if clause--- e.g. If one commits 
premediated murder [of a human being] [making *facts* about the premediated 
murder], then he/she shall be imprisoned for life.

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From: DEMOREP1 at aol.com
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Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2001 21:42:46 EDT
Subject: Re: Some brief campaign argument
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Which methods on the ballot *require* some sort of majority  ???

26 A
25 B
49 Z
100


A and B (a divided majority) have some sort of connection. Z has nothing to 
do with A or B.

What encourages/ requires/ forces a second choice vote ???

In real elections, of course, both a/the majority and a/the minority might be 
split into more parts.



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