[EM] Voting on matters of pure fact
asimmons at krl.org
Fri Apr 20 20:37:45 PDT 2001
>> From: Arnold B. Urken
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Voting on matters of pure fact
>> I have been following this list with interest and would
>> like to point out that there is a literature (going back
>> to Condorcet) about the effects of a voting method on the
>> group probability of making a correct choice. (See my "The
>> Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social
>> Choice Theory" in Public Choice, 1991.) I have done
>> simulations of the effects of one person, one vote,
>> approval, and other methods on group judgmental accuracy.
<one raised eyebrow>
There hasn't been a lot of talk that I've seen (which doesn't
mean a whole lot, of course) about the psychological effects
of voting methods. The assumption seems to be that voting
is a pure economic behavior, which I have to admit seems
>> In juries, jurors prefer a choice because it is a better
>> fit of the facts. Of course, their subjective or
>> performance-based competencies could be factored into
>> computing the collective outcome. The Shapley-Grofman
>> theorem does this.
That's a thought. Juries hadn't occurred to me. Indeed an
example of a vote on a matter of fact. Or perhaps merely a
vote on whether the court may act on a proposed fact.
Somewhat slippery. But the jury sounds like as good an
example as is to be found.
>> Anyone interested in this?
And I'd like to welcome you, presumptuous of me as that may
be, being only a newbie here myself.
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