[EM] A new Smith-efficient, monotone and cloneproof method (significantly different than Schulze/Ranked Pairs)

[Grzegorz Pierczyński]

Hi everyone,

I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very good
axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.

The algorithm proceeds in rounds. Each round is structured as follows:
 * we process pairwise matchups from strongest to weakest,
 * in each processed matchup, the winner qualifies for the next round, and
any further matchups involving them in the current round are skipped,
 * this continues until only one candidate remains unqualified, who is then
eliminated from the election,
 * then the next round begins with all candidates who qualified from the
previous round.
The process repeats until only one candidate remains (which happens after
m-1 rounds), who is declared the winner. Equivalently, we can stop when
there is a Condorcet winner in the election.

This method is significantly different from Schulze or Ranked Pairs --- for
example, in an election with 3 candidates in a cycle, it elects the
candidate with the strongest victory, not the one with the weakest defeat.
Do you see any other strengths/weaknesses of this method?

Best,
Grzegorz Pierczyński
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