[EM] Compromise between IRV and Condorcet methods

[robert bristow-johnson]

You mean BTR-IRV?How about straight-ahead Condorcet with Top-Two Runoff in the case of a cycle?  It's sorta like IRV in the contingency of a cycle.I am beginning to realize that to get legislation passed, we need the language of the proposed law to simply "say what it means and mean what it says.". To me, that means a "Two-method system ", that is straight-ahead Condorcet along with a completion method that, to the pedestrian voter or policy maker, makes simple sense.  Top-two delayed runoff is what we do now in jurisdictions that use FPTP ballots but require a 50% (or sometimes lower, like 40%) vote for the winner.r b-jBurlington Vermont Powered by Cricket Wireless------ Original message------From: Richard via Election-MethodsDate: Thu, Aug 21, 2025 17:18To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com;Cc: Subject:[EM] Compromise between IRV and Condorcet methodsOn 8/21/25 11:37, Chris Benham via Election-Methods wrote:
 > *Elect whichever of the Hare winner and the most approved candidate
 > pairwise beats the other.*

Here I'll put in a plug for refining IRV by eliminating pairwise losing 
candidates when they occur.  It's a simple compromise between IRV and 
Condorcet methods that isn't "clunky" and yields lots of "bang for the 
buck."

A pairwise losing candidate is a candidate who loses every one-on-one 
contest against every other remaining candidate.

Only when a counting round lacks a pairwise losing candidate does the 
combined method fall back on eliminating the candidate with the fewest 
transferred votes.

Richard Fobes

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20250821/e9edf8ff/attachment.htm>