[EM] Compromise between IRV and Condorcet methods

[Richard]

On 8/21/25 11:37, Chris Benham via Election-Methods wrote:
 > *Elect whichever of the Hare winner and the most approved candidate
 > pairwise beats the other.*

Here I'll put in a plug for refining IRV by eliminating pairwise losing 
candidates when they occur.  It's a simple compromise between IRV and 
Condorcet methods that isn't "clunky" and yields lots of "bang for the 
buck."

A pairwise losing candidate is a candidate who loses every one-on-one 
contest against every other remaining candidate.

Only when a counting round lacks a pairwise losing candidate does the 
combined method fall back on eliminating the candidate with the fewest 
transferred votes.

Richard Fobes


On 8/21/25 11:37, Chris Benham via Election-Methods wrote:
> Kevin,
> 
> Thanks for that demonstration.
> 
> A much more simple method (using the same type of ballots) definitely 
> does meet Mono-add-Top:
> 
> *Elect whichever of the Hare winner and the most approved candidate 
> pairwise beats the other.*
> 
> James Green-Armytage mentioned a while ago that he thought that would be 
> a good method. At the time I had different priorities and dismissed it 
> as something clunky that fails Condorcet and Mono-raise, but now I 
> agree. As a practical proposition it is probably doubtful that the extra 
> complication versus plain Hare gives enough bang for buck, and I suppose 
> as well as failing Condorcet it fails Double Defeat.  But nonetheless it 
> must be quite a bit more Condorcet efficient than Hare, while hanging on 
> to Mono-add-Top compliance.
> 
> Chris