[EM] Entry and exit incentives

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2025-04-16 12:18, Toby Pereira wrote:
> I think it's a bit of a myth that one can always clone one's way to 
> victory in Borda. It requires co-ordinating your voters to put the 
> candidate you want to win of the clones at the top while at the same 
> time hoping that the opposition don't do the reverse.

That's a fair point: the strategic incentive measure is artificial in 
that respect.

The measure I had in mind was:
	- Suppose e_X is a sincere election. Let A be the winner of e_X 
according to the method in question.
	- If we then modify the election in some way, while the voters' 
responses don't change, and the winner changes in this particular way, 
then we have an entry (or exit) incentive.

In this way, it's similar to the manipulation measure I've mentioned 
earlier. But it is artificial because it doesn't take into account the 
likelihood of someone being able to pull this strategy off, or how 
either the opposition candidates or the voters could deter the strategy 
by punishing it if it were implemented.

-km