[EM] The Equal Vote Coalition and robla

[Grzegorz Pierczyński]

czw., 3 kwi 2025 o 22:51 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at munsterhjelm.no>
napisał(a):

What do you think of minmax? One possible way to put it is "in the
> absence of a Condorcet winner, elect the candidate who would need the
> fewest additional top votes to become one".
>

For me, among tournament methods there are two options:
(1) Copeland -- easiest to explain, "a candidate with the most victories
wins". There is no need to justify the mechanism (because everyone knows it
works this way in sports tournaments and that's convincing enough), there's
even no need to explain what is the Condorcet winner, why it sometimes may
not exist, etc., ...
(2) ... and if we are not afraid of explaining all this stuff, then we can
go for Ranked Pairs as well, since it's only a bit harder to explain than
Minmax, but much easier to justify axiomatically. For RP, you just say:
"Construct the final classification by considering pairwise victories one
by one, starting from the strongest ones. If A defeats B, then A is higher
than B in the classification. Omit a victory if considering it would create
a contradiction with the ones considered so far".

Personally, I like the second option most. That's really not rocket
science, if someone is interested and doesn't get it immediately, a
simple example illustrating it would be enough. The D'Hondt method for
parliamentary elections is much less intuitive and harder to explain, but
somehow it is widely used. IMO, implementing Condorcet is hard not because
of the conceptual complexity, but just because it would revolutionize the
political scene so much that it would never be safe for a ruling party.

Btw, I also do not see any advantages of BTR-IRV, except for "being
IRV-ish" --- and IRV is not *that* popular for it to make sense. If we care
about no axioms except for CW or Smith, I'd rather go for BTR-Plurality (so
BTR-IRV, but without all this "recalculating scores" stuff --- which
immediately restricts the audience to people familiar with IRV and is
pretty pointless in elections with a CW). This would be also superior to
Condorcet-Plurality / TTR, I guess.

Best,
Grzegorz


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