[EM] Approval vs Condorcet. Voting in Approval.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Because KM replied inline, I’ll do the same, meaning that my comments will
necessarily be farther down, because I want to include what KM was replying
to:

On Sun, May 26, 2024 at 02:50 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-05-16 08:04, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> > I’m glad you brought up the desire for the method to do it all for us
> > (as Condorcet does)…taking our sincere rankings as input, & outputting
> > the legalistic right choice. …because I’ve been meaning to address that
> > matter.
> >
> > …& that’s not even counting the much less expensive implementation
> > (could be zero cost, without even needing new count-software), easier
> > less expensive administration, & easier simpler explanation with
> > consequent easier enactment.
> >
> > Approval isn’t as difficult to vote as it opponents claim.  There are
> > many ways to choose what or whom to approve. That variety is a good
> > thing, because you can choose how you like.
> >
> > Condorcet is legalistic, but we don’t have to be legalistic! Approval
> > guarantees election of the candidate who maximizes the number of voters
> > for whom the outcome is in their preferred of the two merit-subsets,
> > however the voter designates them.
> >
> > e.g. If people approve what they like, Approval maximizes the number of
> > people who like the outcome.
> >
> > If people approve what’s acceptable, then Approval maximizes the number
> > of people for whom the outcome is acceptable.
> >
> > If people approve above expectation, then Approval maximizes the number
> > of people for whom the outcome is above expectation…maximizes the number
> > of people pleasantly surprised.
> >
> > You don’t know the objectively-optimal vote? Neither does anyone else,
> > so don’t worry about it!
>
> This makes it very hard to reason about or define any relative
> properties about Approval…


Not answerable without specifics.

>
though, because it kicks the can down the
> road to the voter instead.


Yes, that just rewords what I said. I said that Approval leaves the choice
with the  voter, instead of doing everything for us. …instead of isolating
& sheltering us from the choice.

>
>
> This is perhaps a bit exaggerated, but to show a point: does Approval
> really pass clone independence? Suppose more candidates of a wing show
> up, which embolden people to be more discerning than just approving
> what's acceptable. Then the winner changes.


I don’t know. It depends on how you define that criterion. Anyway, that’s
entirely your business. Approval has the properties that I stated, & can be
used as I stated. Feel free to describe it in other ways.

Is "Approval"[1] *really* FBC, or monotone?


See above.

If it converges to the
> Condorcet winner, then nope, because you can't have FBC and Condorcet.


That’s absurd. The Condorcet Criterion (CC) is about one election, not
about what can later be achieved after the voters gain information from a
sequence of elections. You’re drastically changing the definition of CC.

By the definition of FBC, Approval meets CC.

By saying "don't sweat it, people will do what they will do, there's no
> objective meaning to the ballot except what the voters like"…


I didn’t say all of that. It isn’t possible to answer a misquote.


voter
> behavior becomes so much more intermixed with the method. And then, for
> criteria to compare apples to apples, they should take this intermixing
> into account.


Define criteria as you want, & do what you want with them.

Is Approval different enough that you have trouble deciding how to apply
criteria to Approval? Maybe so. That’s entirely your business.

Not being legalistic shouldn't let Approval off the hook.


…& what hook would that be?  :-D

Approval maximizes the number of people who regard the winner among the
better of the importantly merit-different 2 exclusive sets.

…e.g. the number who like the winner or considering it acceptable… or
whatever distinction a particular voter regards as important.

That isn’t legalistic. We needn’t be legalistic. …even if you believe in a
“ hook” that requires legalism.



>
> But how?
>
> What I want is to have each method equally on the hook for what its
> behavior implies.


…whatever that means.


To paraphrase a reply I made to rb-j: if the winner of
> an election can change when non-winners drop out, we don't really care
> if the method passes IIA as such. It's a nice thing to have in a
> box-ticking way, but that's it.


If you don’t care & I don’t care, then we don’t care.

Suit yourself. I don’t know what you mean, but what you want is your
business.


If a method wants to open up the can of worms to say "nope, this method
> isn't meant to be used in isolation, it's supposed to be used with
> /whatever/ internal way of going from utilities to the types of
> expression the ballot accepts", then okay, let's take it at face value.
> Let's ask the questions that matter. Can this make someone lose if some
> of the honest voters like the candidate more? Can it make a non-winner
> change who the winner is?


Suit yourself & ask what you want. Approval offer’s what I said. I can’t
speak for whatever else you want instead.

>
>
> For ranking, this is easy, courtesy of the "legalism". For Approval, not
> so much.


Legalism is what you want, & that’s fine.

>
>
> -km
>
> [1] or rather, the method induced by iterating Approval or by combining
> Approval with one or more thresholding strategies implicitly chosen by a
> voter.
>
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