[EM] Brief Ranked-Pairs definition

[Michael Ossipoff]

Absolutely right !! As I said before, RP needs the same preliminary
pairwise-count & defeat-strength definitions as the other
entirely-pairwise-count Condorcet methods.

I was just stating the specifically RP definition.

On Sun, May 26, 2024 at 13:47 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> Mike,
>
> > Elect the candidate not beaten among all the strongest defeats that
> > don’t contradict (form any cycles with) each other.
>
> That definition is "brief" but isn't complete, i.e. it doesn't give
> enough information to know how to operate the method because it doesn't
> explain what "strongest" means (or exactly how we measure "strength").
>
> As you know, more than one way has been suggested/advocated.   You like
> "Winning Votes"  (that used to be called on EM "Votes Against").  There
> used to be some people here who advocated for Margins.
>
> I like Approval Margins (explicit) which gives similar results to the
> Margins Sorted Approval method I now support.  And others are possible.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 17/05/2024 10:55 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> >
> > Elect the candidate not beaten among all the strongest defeats that
> > don’t contradict (form any cycles with) eachother.
> > ————-
> > In my recent Approval-post, I forgot to mention (but have mentioned
> > elsewhere) that Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
> > voter-median.
> >
> > i.e. Approval homes-in on where the CW is.
> >
> > (A Myerson-Weber equilibrium is an outcome consistent with,
> > confirming, the voters’ beliefs that led to that outcome.)
> >
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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