[EM] 28 years of progress and a wakeup call

[Michael Garman]

Good luck explaining that to a low engagement voter.
On Thu, May 23, 2024 at 8:21 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> One-sentence definition of RP:
>
> Elect the candidate who isn’t beaten among all of the strongest defeats
> that don’t contradict (cycle with) eachother.
> —-
>
> That’s unambiguous, clear & explicit. There’s only 1 meaning that it could
> have.
>
> The following wording is longer, but it entirely spells out the procedure.
>
> List the pairwise defeats one at a time, stronger ones first.
>
> But, if the next-strongest one forms a cycle with already-listed defeats,
> then skip that one.
>
> When all defeats have been listed or skipped, elect the candidate who
> isn’t defeated in any listed defeat.
> —-
>
> You might offer, with it, MinMax:
>
> Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.
> —-
>
> RP is better. MM is simpler.
>
> (Obviously both methods need the usual preliminary definitions.)
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 23, 2024 at 10:19 robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On 05/23/2024 11:03 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > I think Condorcet//IRV would work fine, and surely could get some
>> > support from IRV supporters.
>> >
>> > > What's the one-sentence principle (that's actually true) that
>> describes IRV?
>> > *Until one candidate remains, one-at-a-time eliminate the favorite
>> > (among remaining candidates) of the fewest.*
>> >
>> > The palaver about a "majority" is just to shorten the counting process,
>> > and also fits in with the marketing.
>> >
>> > Since you are obsessed with "clear and simple language"  am I right in
>> > assuming that for you selling and explaining the concept of the "Smith
>> > set" (or top cycle) is out?
>>
>> Can you imagine legislative language, first defining the Smith set and
>> then the actual reference to the Smith set in the verbiage of the law?
>>
>> > What is your problem with  Condorcet//Approval?    If you don't like
>> the
>> > "implicit" version (where all candidates ranked above bottom are
>> > considered approved), then what about the "explicit" version?
>>
>> I just want Condorcet in law, that spells out plainly who the Condorcet
>> winner is and how that candidate is identified from the ballot data.  Now,
>> being a two-method system, the law will also have to spell out what to do
>> when there is no Condorcet winner.  Condorcet-Approval is pretty simple and
>> implicitly defining any ranked candidate as having received an Approval
>> vote is simple enough.  Perhaps it could be a better law than
>> Condorcet-Plurality or Condorcet-TTR.
>>
>> What are the tactical/strategic voting implications of
>> Condorcet-Approval?  How is it better to disincentivize strategic or
>> tactical voting?  What are the pitfalls?
>>
>> I'm a bit concerned about the loss of voter expressivity in the case of a
>> cycle, with Condorcet-Approval.
>>
>> I am a little concerned about two candidates, say George W Bush and
>> Donald Trump, neither whom I approve, but I may very well rank W one rung
>> higher than the corrupt, criminal, mendacious, narcissistic demagogue.  So
>> I would have to rank W which would imply approval if the election goes into
>> a cycle.
>>
>> > But several other ballot styles have been suggested for this type of
>> > method.  Someone liked having a Yes/No box next to every candidate.
>> The
>> > approval cutoff being a "virtual candidate" has been suggested, a 0-100
>> > score ballot with scores above 50 counting as approval and so on.  I
>> > suggested that the voters could mark the lowest ranked candidate they
>> > approve, and so that candidate plus the ones they rank not below that
>> > candidate are counted as approved.
>>
>> I think anything more than just asking voters to rank their preferences
>> is asking too much.  It requires or burdens the voters to think tactically.
>>
>> I'm still thinking perhaps Condorcet-TTR might be best.  It's within
>> epsilon of Condorcet-IRV (like that California bill from a few years ago)
>> but it doesn't carry the semantic baggage of all of the IRV elements (like
>> "active candidates" or "continuing candidates" or transferred votes, etc.).
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>> .
>> .
>> .
>> ----
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>> info
>>
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