[EM] Approval vs Condorcet. Voting in Approval.

[Michael Ossipoff]

It could be argued that, if the pairwise-count software is in each
voting-terminal, then it would be more work for the tampered. But it would
also be more work for count-security to make sure that there isn’t
tampering.

Besides, what if the terminals arrive from the manufacturer with the
fraud-code already in them, well concealed?

If that sounds far-fetched, then I remind you that a voting-machine
manufacturer (Diebold?) promised to “deliver” the election to Dubya (& then
did so).

Look at Harpers Magazine for immediately after Dubya’s two elections. The
report mountains of evidence for big count-fraud in each of those 2
elections.

Anyway, isn’t computer-security always an ongoing touch-&-go battle between
security & wrongdoers?  …with the wrongdoers sometimes winning?

On Sat, May 18, 2024 at 02:08 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> It’s necessary to  count N(N-1) pairwise vote-totals.  …2 for each pair.
>
> What if there are lot of candidates?
>
> The trick-software could be in the part that initially increments the
> N(N-1) vote-totals, even if that’s immediately done at the  voting-machine.
>
> The only thing that the voter checked for accuracy was his ranking.
> There’s no guarantee that the pairwise  vote-totals were incremented
> honesty.
>
> So a handcount-audit would require doing the whole exhaustive
> pairwise-count, from the raw rankings.
>
> 25 candidates? 600 pairwise  vote-totals to count.
>
> Of course there’d be an effort for security, but, undeniably, it would be
> easier & more able to be counted-on with approvals.
>
> To maximize count-security, of course it’s Approval.
>
> It’s getting late ⏰, so I’d best continue this topic in the morning.
>
> In. Vermont it’s 6:00 a.m.  I hope you’re getting up early, & not staying
> late !
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2024 at 01:06 robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On 05/16/2024 2:04 AM EDT Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > …
>> > Count-fraud is a problem. Condorcet’s humungously computation-intensive
>> count ridiculously facilitates count-fraud.
>>
>> I consider Condorcet to be precinct summable with no more than N^2 number
>> of tallies.  I think 16 tallies for 4 candidates is feasible.  Even 25
>> tallies for 5 candidates.
>>
>> The N(N-1)/2 pairwise comparison are done as the ballot is scanned by the
>> tabulator machine.  That part is opaque, but the rest of it is completely
>> transparent and the complexity is small.
>>
>> Unlike IRV has been, Condorcet RCV can have election results on election
>> night.
>>
>> > …
>> > You want to do a handcount-audit of a Condorcet count?
>>
>> Hand-counting Condorcet is processing the pile of ballots N(N-1)/2
>> times.  Hand-counting IRV is processing the pile of ballots N-1 times.
>>
>> > …
>> > Additionally, the count-program itself is easier to hide or add
>> fraud-code in.
>>
>> But, this is only at the tabulator level.  When the ballot is inserted
>> into the tabulator.
>>
>> No different than we have now with FPTP.  That part of the data trail is
>> opaque to protect the Secret Ballot.  But the rest of it can be transparent
>> with Condorcet RCV, as it already is with FPTP.
>>
>> > …
>> > As a general principle, then yes it’s much better to have the voters do
>> it for themselves rather than having a complicated fraud-prone
>> automatic-machine do everything for them.
>>
>> Pick a precinct and hand count it.  Not much worse than IRV.
>>
>> Results are summable.  Not so with IRV.
>>
>> This is pretty transparent.
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>> .
>> .
>> .
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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