[EM] Approval vs Condorcet. Voting in Approval.
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Sat May 18 02:08:02 PDT 2024
It’s necessary to count N(N-1) pairwise vote-totals. …2 for each pair.
What if there are lot of candidates?
The trick-software could be in the part that initially increments the
N(N-1) vote-totals, even if that’s immediately done at the voting-machine.
The only thing that the voter checked for accuracy was his ranking. There’s
no guarantee that the pairwise vote-totals were incremented honesty.
So a handcount-audit would require doing the whole exhaustive
pairwise-count, from the raw rankings.
25 candidates? 600 pairwise vote-totals to count.
Of course there’d be an effort for security, but, undeniably, it would be
easier & more able to be counted-on with approvals.
To maximize count-security, of course it’s Approval.
It’s getting late ⏰, so I’d best continue this topic in the morning.
In. Vermont it’s 6:00 a.m. I hope you’re getting up early, & not staying
late !
On Sat, May 18, 2024 at 01:06 robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>
> > On 05/16/2024 2:04 AM EDT Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > …
> > Count-fraud is a problem. Condorcet’s humungously computation-intensive
> count ridiculously facilitates count-fraud.
>
> I consider Condorcet to be precinct summable with no more than N^2 number
> of tallies. I think 16 tallies for 4 candidates is feasible. Even 25
> tallies for 5 candidates.
>
> The N(N-1)/2 pairwise comparison are done as the ballot is scanned by the
> tabulator machine. That part is opaque, but the rest of it is completely
> transparent and the complexity is small.
>
> Unlike IRV has been, Condorcet RCV can have election results on election
> night.
>
> > …
> > You want to do a handcount-audit of a Condorcet count?
>
> Hand-counting Condorcet is processing the pile of ballots N(N-1)/2 times.
> Hand-counting IRV is processing the pile of ballots N-1 times.
>
> > …
> > Additionally, the count-program itself is easier to hide or add
> fraud-code in.
>
> But, this is only at the tabulator level. When the ballot is inserted
> into the tabulator.
>
> No different than we have now with FPTP. That part of the data trail is
> opaque to protect the Secret Ballot. But the rest of it can be transparent
> with Condorcet RCV, as it already is with FPTP.
>
> > …
> > As a general principle, then yes it’s much better to have the voters do
> it for themselves rather than having a complicated fraud-prone
> automatic-machine do everything for them.
>
> Pick a precinct and hand count it. Not much worse than IRV.
>
> Results are summable. Not so with IRV.
>
> This is pretty transparent.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
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