[EM] A graphical simulation for your browser. 50+ methods

[Chris Benham]

Kevin,

> A central concern is that when ballots are truncated, preference information is
> lost, and that loss may be unevenly distributed.

Given that voters are allowed to have equal-preferences, how do we know 
that necessarily "preference information is lost"?

The "lost" or hidden preferences  (a) may not exist and (b) be of such a 
quality that the method is better served not knowing what they are, 
because if it did it could be confused into producing a lower social 
utility winner.

I think it is better to assume that a lot of truncation (especially by 
the supporters of the major candidates) is natural and normal, and then 
assess the consequences of voters adding preferences.

Chris B.





> *Kevin Venzke*stepjak at yahoo.fr 
> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20A%20graphical%20simulation%20for%20your%20browser.%2050%2B%20methods&In-Reply-To=%3C1454074217.11781336.1715032143943%40mail.yahoo.com%3E>
> /Mon May 6 14:49:03 PDT 2024/
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hello, here is a scenario generator to explore:
>
> What if voters only use truncation strategies?
> votingmethods.net/trunc
>
> Features: Over 50 methods, numerous settings, spatial or non-spatial preferences,
> ability to save/load scenarios, conversion to ballots, stats on sincere Condorcet
> efficiency and method similarity.
>
> The truncation strategies include fixed or random thresholds, as well as strategies
> based on the voters having an awareness of two frontrunners, chosen in various ways.
>
> A central concern is that when ballots are truncated, preference information is
> lost, and that loss may be unevenly distributed. I try to depict this graphically.
> You can observe often that a sincere Condorcet winner loses the CW status to someone
> else when the votes are cast.
>
> I could not include STAR, since that is a ratings method, but I did implement "ATAR"
> and "BTAR" substitutes using implicit approval and an interpretation of Borda.
>
> Kevin
> votingmethods.net
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