[EM] Hare

[Michael Ossipoff]

Well, I didn’t toprank it. I topranked Approval.

But I topranked Condorcet-IRV with respect to the ranked methods.

On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 00:16 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> In this poll, I topranked Condorcet,IRV (aka Benham), because it’s
> Condorcet-complying, & it’s Hare-ancestry confers
> offensive-strategy-resistance.
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 21:36 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 20:08 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm sorry Mike, but I find this to be an absurd inversion of the truth.
>>
>>
>> What do you have against pizza & movies?
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Hare's  LNHarm,
>>
>>
>> FairVote makes much of that because it’s IRV’s claim-to-game. Its
>> strong-suit.
>>
>> LNHa gives you the freedom to express preference among even your
>> bottom-most choices. … to vote nearly-worst over even-worse.
>>
>> You pay for your bottom-end freedom with abysmal top-end favorite-burial
>> need.
>>
>>
>> LNHelp
>>
>>
>> Is that a problem with Condorcet? It hasn’t worried me, & I haven’t heard
>> about it as a problem.
>>
>>>
>> Clone Independence,
>>
>>
>> Of course RP & Schulz are clone-independent.
>>
>>>
>> a quite weak Compromise
>>> incentive
>>
>>
>> In what part of the Twilight-Zone?
>>
>> IRV has horrendous favorite-burial need.
>>
>> Just for this discussion, let’s simplify by pretending that the Democrats
>> are acceptable.
>>
>> Say it’s Trump, Biden & Jill Stein.
>>
>> Say you like Stein best.
>>
>> But say that a lot of Biden-preferrers like her least & are expected to
>> rank Trump 2nd because their sources have so much bad to say about Stein.
>>
>> But say Stein has a strong following, & her preferrers, including  you,
>> are numerous enough to make her eliminate Biden.
>>
>> Maybe Stein can beat Trump, & maybe not (because this is a story).
>>
>> Do you toprank Stein, to eliminate Joe, so that his voters will transfer
>> to Trump, electing Trump?
>>
>> If you know what you’re doing, you bury your favorite under Joe.
>>
>> Will that situation happen all the time? No.
>>
>> But if preventing the election of an unacceptable is paramount, so that
>> you don’t want to take any chance when it’s uncertain, then you must bury
>> your favorite under the compromise, even if you dislike the compromise.
>>
>> But wait—it gets even better:
>>
>>
>> Say it isn’t certain which Acceptable will be the one that you can help
>> to avoid elimination.
>>
>> You have to guess. You have to try your best to rank the Acceptables in
>> order of winnability… starting with the one most likely to get enough
>> 2st-choice support from the other Acceptables-preferrers to escape
>> elimination.
>>
>> You have to make that guess about the other Acceptables-preferrers…the
>> order in which the Acceptables will be supported by them, thereby making
>> them prospects for escaping elimination.
>>
>> Sound familiar? That’s right: It’s just the same as Plurality.
>>
>> Just a more expensive Plurality election.
>>
>> wv Condorcet has zero “compromise incentive”.
>>
>> Yes, other Condorcet versions have that problem, due to their
>> burial-vulnerability. …resulting in a problem resembling IRV.
>>
>> But, with wv Condorcet, burial is well-deterred, because it’s 10 times
>> more likely to backfire than to succeed.
>>
>>  Offensive-strategy is the only problem with Condorcet. FairVote makes
>> much of that, claiming that all Condorcet has that problem.
>>
>> Forgive me for disappointing you, but wv * doesn’t* have that or any
>> strategy problem.
>>
>> I prefer Hare to Condorcet for pizza-topping, ice-cream flavor or
>> movie-choice, because of the 2 Hare advantages that I stated.
>>
>> The choice between Condorcet & Hare for public political elections is:
>>
>> Do you want complete freedom from strategy-need, or do you want
>> abominable favorite- burial need?
>>
>>
>>
>> and invulnerability to any other strategy except difficult-
>>> to-coordinate (and somewhat risky) Push-over are all things of use in a
>>> tough competitive election (with plenty of mutual enmity).
>>>
>>> What's useful or attractive about any of those properties in a friendly
>>> election about pizza toppings or movies?  For that some Condorcet method
>>> or Score or even Borda should be fine.
>>>
>>> Chris B.
>>>
>>> On 12/05/2024 5:58 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>> > When there are no unacceptable alternatives, no greater-evil, & no
>>> > enmity, then Hare would be fine.
>>> >
>>> > .. with the advantages of no unfavorite compromise & an easy handcount.
>>> >
>>> > Great for pizza 🍕 toppings or movies 🍿.
>>> >
>>> > …but not for public political elections.
>>> >
>>> > ----
>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>> list info
>>>
>>
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