[EM] Hare

[Michael Ossipoff]

In this poll, I topranked Condorcet,IRV (aka Benham), because it’s
Condorcet-complying, & it’s Hare-ancestry confers
offensive-strategy-resistance.

On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 21:36 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 20:08 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> I'm sorry Mike, but I find this to be an absurd inversion of the truth.
>
>
> What do you have against pizza & movies?
>
>
>
>>
>> Hare's  LNHarm,
>
>
> FairVote makes much of that because it’s IRV’s claim-to-game. Its
> strong-suit.
>
> LNHa gives you the freedom to express preference among even your
> bottom-most choices. … to vote nearly-worst over even-worse.
>
> You pay for your bottom-end freedom with abysmal top-end favorite-burial
> need.
>
>
> LNHelp
>
>
> Is that a problem with Condorcet? It hasn’t worried me, & I haven’t heard
> about it as a problem.
>
>>
> Clone Independence,
>
>
> Of course RP & Schulz are clone-independent.
>
>>
> a quite weak Compromise
>> incentive
>
>
> In what part of the Twilight-Zone?
>
> IRV has horrendous favorite-burial need.
>
> Just for this discussion, let’s simplify by pretending that the Democrats
> are acceptable.
>
> Say it’s Trump, Biden & Jill Stein.
>
> Say you like Stein best.
>
> But say that a lot of Biden-preferrers like her least & are expected to
> rank Trump 2nd because their sources have so much bad to say about Stein.
>
> But say Stein has a strong following, & her preferrers, including  you,
> are numerous enough to make her eliminate Biden.
>
> Maybe Stein can beat Trump, & maybe not (because this is a story).
>
> Do you toprank Stein, to eliminate Joe, so that his voters will transfer
> to Trump, electing Trump?
>
> If you know what you’re doing, you bury your favorite under Joe.
>
> Will that situation happen all the time? No.
>
> But if preventing the election of an unacceptable is paramount, so that
> you don’t want to take any chance when it’s uncertain, then you must bury
> your favorite under the compromise, even if you dislike the compromise.
>
> But wait—it gets even better:
>
>
> Say it isn’t certain which Acceptable will be the one that you can help to
> avoid elimination.
>
> You have to guess. You have to try your best to rank the Acceptables in
> order of winnability… starting with the one most likely to get enough
> 2st-choice support from the other Acceptables-preferrers to escape
> elimination.
>
> You have to make that guess about the other Acceptables-preferrers…the
> order in which the Acceptables will be supported by them, thereby making
> them prospects for escaping elimination.
>
> Sound familiar? That’s right: It’s just the same as Plurality.
>
> Just a more expensive Plurality election.
>
> wv Condorcet has zero “compromise incentive”.
>
> Yes, other Condorcet versions have that problem, due to their
> burial-vulnerability. …resulting in a problem resembling IRV.
>
> But, with wv Condorcet, burial is well-deterred, because it’s 10 times
> more likely to backfire than to succeed.
>
>  Offensive-strategy is the only problem with Condorcet. FairVote makes
> much of that, claiming that all Condorcet has that problem.
>
> Forgive me for disappointing you, but wv * doesn’t* have that or any
> strategy problem.
>
> I prefer Hare to Condorcet for pizza-topping, ice-cream flavor or
> movie-choice, because of the 2 Hare advantages that I stated.
>
> The choice between Condorcet & Hare for public political elections is:
>
> Do you want complete freedom from strategy-need, or do you want abominable
> favorite- burial need?
>
>
>
> and invulnerability to any other strategy except difficult-
>> to-coordinate (and somewhat risky) Push-over are all things of use in a
>> tough competitive election (with plenty of mutual enmity).
>>
>> What's useful or attractive about any of those properties in a friendly
>> election about pizza toppings or movies?  For that some Condorcet method
>> or Score or even Borda should be fine.
>>
>> Chris B.
>>
>> On 12/05/2024 5:58 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>> > When there are no unacceptable alternatives, no greater-evil, & no
>> > enmity, then Hare would be fine.
>> >
>> > .. with the advantages of no unfavorite compromise & an easy handcount.
>> >
>> > Great for pizza 🍕 toppings or movies 🍿.
>> >
>> > …but not for public political elections.
>> >
>> > ----
>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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