[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Apportionment is equivalent to proportional representation in the case
where voters cast partisan votes. i.e. if the party-list form of your rule
fails a criterion, your rule also fails that criterion.

Any quota-transfer system reduces to largest remainders in the partisan
voters case, which fails monotonicity.

On Tue, Mar 26, 2024 at 12:35 AM Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
wrote:

>
>
> Thank you for your reply.
>
> Perhaps you have "no idea" because your reasoning doesn't strictly follow.
> And perhaps you jump in with your (further) "No" without a real
> disagreement.
>
> Apportionment has its place in Congress, for instance, but is the feature
> of oligarchic party list systems, in the context of voting methods
> discussed, and quotas the feature of democratic forms of "proportional
> representation."
>
> Regards,
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
> On 25/03/2024 23:42, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
>
> As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is
>> solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no
>> connection to reality.
>>
> No idea what this refers to, given STV isn't related to Arrow's theorem.
>
> The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of
>> plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.
>
>
> No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds you
> have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight event.
> Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.
>
>  The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.
>>
> That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for why
> every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think *most* of STV's
> nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.
>
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Exactly so, Michael Garman. opposition was incited against STV because:
>> You'll get a black mayor.
>>
>> Indeed you would. The one or two communists elected by STV in NYC were
>> representing sweated labour in the textile industry. No mention of the fact
>> that abolishing STV gave one-party rule. In NYC the Machine, Tammany Hall
>> bankrupted the city, for the classic reason of lack of opposition holding
>> to account. The city machines held "battering ram" referendums with the
>> money and publicity on side. They succumbed to the onslaught except in
>> Cambridge with a 30,000 strong MIT, which had to endure 6 referendums in 16
>> years. Such was the fanatical meal-ticket politics of the one-party
>> machines. STV had been promoted, despite politicians power-greed, by
>> mathematicians, who knew their business and weren't afraid of "the key to
>> democracy."
>>
>> As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is
>> solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no
>> connection to reality. The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing
>> a remnant of plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.
>> The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.
>>
>> I have invented an STV exclusion count which is an iteration of the
>> election count; both therefore monotonic; a "scientific" one-truth voting
>> method, unlike other voting methods the world uses. I posted programmers
>> links, none of which, the list manager has so far redeemed.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Richard Lung.
>>
>>
>> On 25/03/2024 17:18, Michael Garman wrote:
>>
>> Much of the opposition to STV came from the fact that it was electing —
>> shudder! black people and even communists — in a political climate where
>> those were seen as two of the worst traits a politician could have. That,
>> more than non-monotonicity, was what did it in in NYC and elsewhere. I
>> don’t find “reactionaries won’t like it” to be a convincing argument
>> against progress.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 6:08 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost
>>>> and then convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you could argue
>>>> that certain reforms would turn the public off the idea of structural
>>>> change once and for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.
>>>>
>>> I don't think convincing people the current system is bad is very
>>> helpful unless you have a better alternative. People tend to flail about
>>> and pick the first system they think of or hear about—like IRV—and
>>> sometimes even pick a disastrous system like Borda. After a state or city
>>> picks a new system, they usually stick with it for decades out of pure
>>> inertia, meaning it locks us out of systems that actually improve the
>>> election's results. If nothing else, promoting these systems wastes time
>>> and effort that could be better-spent elsewhere.
>>>
>>> It's also easier to argue for a better policy than a worse one. If
>>> reform movements didn't have so many problems with Nobel-laureate
>>> economists and political scientists writing newspaper articles and papers
>>> about IRV not working that well, and didn't have major disasters like
>>> Alaska's 2022 election to deal with, things would probably be an easier
>>> sell.
>>>
>>> It's worth noting we have a case study of this. During the Progressive
>>> Era in the 1910s, lots of US cities adopted new voting systems, typically
>>> STV. These rules survived only a few decades before repeal. Most famously,
>>> in New York, STV caused so many monotonicity failures that the city decided
>>> to kill the only large-scale proportional representation system in the
>>> United States after officials derided it for being a lottery.
>>>
>>> It's taken 100 years for the electoral reform movement to recover and
>>> get a second chance. I don't want to wait another 100 years for a reform
>>> that might actually stick this time.
>>>
>>> On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 4:12 PM Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> >  Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice problem is
>>>> likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone who
>>>> thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
>>>> not go for that method.
>>>>
>>>> For sure. It's a reasonable argument.
>>>>
>>>> I think the principal consideration to bear in mind is where the
>>>> opposition is coming from and what their arguments are. If I were an
>>>> activist in a community where the prevailing opinion was that reform was
>>>> necessary, I'd be all for having a debate about the merits of different
>>>> methods and the relative logistical complications they might pose.
>>>>
>>>> My concern right now is that most people aren't open to *any* reform,
>>>> and if the public-facing image they see is a reform movement that can't
>>>> even agree on a measure to push, they'll be even more skeptical. Not that
>>>> we can't or shouldn't have these debates, of course. But I think the
>>>> Seattle 2022 example -- where the IRV supporters were at fault! -- is
>>>> exactly the opposite of what we want to happen. Overall support for the
>>>> first part of the question -- the one that was essentially "should we scrap
>>>> FPP?" was way lower than it would have been if there hadn't been confusion
>>>> over competing proposals and the impression of a fractured reform community.
>>>>
>>>> I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost
>>>> and then convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you could argue
>>>> that certain reforms would turn the public off the idea of structural
>>>> change once and for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:07 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-03-20 09:57, Michael Garman wrote:
>>>>> > To be clear, I am by no means a believer that IRV is the only reform
>>>>> > worth pursuing, or that it’s anywhere close to the perfect system.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Where Michael and I disagree is on the role of pragmatism. I believe
>>>>> > that any time an alternative to plurality voting is on the ballot,
>>>>> > voters should support it. I think the folks in Eugene, Oregon,
>>>>> should
>>>>> > vote yes on STAR. I think more places should try out approval.
>>>>> Beyond
>>>>> > those three, I read this list because I enjoy learning about
>>>>> completely
>>>>> > new and different systems that would be fascinating to see in
>>>>> practice
>>>>> > somewhere one day. But in a place where citizens are asked for an up
>>>>> or
>>>>> > down vote on IRV vs. FPTP, I don’t see how you can defend voting for
>>>>> the
>>>>> > worst possible system because the proposed reform isn’t exactly what
>>>>> > you’d like.
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you think about the following reasoning? Call it the "fool me
>>>>> twice" problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> Suppose that a jurisdiction is considering switching from FPTP to
>>>>> Borda.
>>>>> The main organization is heavily marketing Borda as the one ranked
>>>>> voting system, equating the ranked ballot format to Borda, the method.
>>>>>
>>>>> Meanwhile, an organization promoting MDDA (majority defeat
>>>>> disqualification approval) is slowly growing. Someone (call him John)
>>>>> favors MDDA and thinks that due to Borda's clone problem, it will
>>>>> quickly be repealed. Then, he reasons, the jurisdiction will think
>>>>> that
>>>>> ranking equals Borda, so that when some other ranked method is
>>>>> proposed
>>>>> (MDDA, say), they will remember the failure of Borda that led to its
>>>>> repeal and say "no; fool me twice, shame on me".
>>>>>
>>>>> Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a considerable chance
>>>>> that Borda would be repealed if it were enacted, and a lesser chance
>>>>> that MDDA would. Is then John in the right to withhold his support for
>>>>> Borda? Would it be right for the MDDA organization to try to counter
>>>>> the
>>>>> Borda organization's marketing by saying more ranked methods exist,
>>>>> even
>>>>> if doing so reduces the chance that Borda is enacted?
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice problem is
>>>>> likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone
>>>>> who
>>>>> thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
>>>>> not go for that method.
>>>>>
>>>>> -km
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>
>>>
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>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
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