[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is
> solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no
> connection to reality.
>
No idea what this refers to, given STV isn't related to Arrow's theorem.

The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of plurality
> voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.


No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds you
have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight event.
Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.

 The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.
>
That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for why
every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think *most* of STV's
nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
wrote:

>
> Exactly so, Michael Garman. opposition was incited against STV because:
> You'll get a black mayor.
>
> Indeed you would. The one or two communists elected by STV in NYC were
> representing sweated labour in the textile industry. No mention of the fact
> that abolishing STV gave one-party rule. In NYC the Machine, Tammany Hall
> bankrupted the city, for the classic reason of lack of opposition holding
> to account. The city machines held "battering ram" referendums with the
> money and publicity on side. They succumbed to the onslaught except in
> Cambridge with a 30,000 strong MIT, which had to endure 6 referendums in 16
> years. Such was the fanatical meal-ticket politics of the one-party
> machines. STV had been promoted, despite politicians power-greed, by
> mathematicians, who knew their business and weren't afraid of "the key to
> democracy."
>
> As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is
> solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no
> connection to reality. The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing
> a remnant of plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.
> The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.
>
> I have invented an STV exclusion count which is an iteration of the
> election count; both therefore monotonic; a "scientific" one-truth voting
> method, unlike other voting methods the world uses. I posted programmers
> links, none of which, the list manager has so far redeemed.
>
> Regards,
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
> On 25/03/2024 17:18, Michael Garman wrote:
>
> Much of the opposition to STV came from the fact that it was electing —
> shudder! black people and even communists — in a political climate where
> those were seen as two of the worst traits a politician could have. That,
> more than non-monotonicity, was what did it in in NYC and elsewhere. I
> don’t find “reactionaries won’t like it” to be a convincing argument
> against progress.
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 6:08 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost
>>> and then convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you could argue
>>> that certain reforms would turn the public off the idea of structural
>>> change once and for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.
>>>
>> I don't think convincing people the current system is bad is very helpful
>> unless you have a better alternative. People tend to flail about and pick
>> the first system they think of or hear about—like IRV—and sometimes even
>> pick a disastrous system like Borda. After a state or city picks a new
>> system, they usually stick with it for decades out of pure inertia, meaning
>> it locks us out of systems that actually improve the election's results. If
>> nothing else, promoting these systems wastes time and effort that could be
>> better-spent elsewhere.
>>
>> It's also easier to argue for a better policy than a worse one. If reform
>> movements didn't have so many problems with Nobel-laureate economists and
>> political scientists writing newspaper articles and papers about IRV not
>> working that well, and didn't have major disasters like Alaska's 2022
>> election to deal with, things would probably be an easier sell.
>>
>> It's worth noting we have a case study of this. During the Progressive
>> Era in the 1910s, lots of US cities adopted new voting systems, typically
>> STV. These rules survived only a few decades before repeal. Most famously,
>> in New York, STV caused so many monotonicity failures that the city decided
>> to kill the only large-scale proportional representation system in the
>> United States after officials derided it for being a lottery.
>>
>> It's taken 100 years for the electoral reform movement to recover and get
>> a second chance. I don't want to wait another 100 years for a reform that
>> might actually stick this time.
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 4:12 PM Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> >  Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice problem is
>>> likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone who
>>> thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
>>> not go for that method.
>>>
>>> For sure. It's a reasonable argument.
>>>
>>> I think the principal consideration to bear in mind is where the
>>> opposition is coming from and what their arguments are. If I were an
>>> activist in a community where the prevailing opinion was that reform was
>>> necessary, I'd be all for having a debate about the merits of different
>>> methods and the relative logistical complications they might pose.
>>>
>>> My concern right now is that most people aren't open to *any* reform,
>>> and if the public-facing image they see is a reform movement that can't
>>> even agree on a measure to push, they'll be even more skeptical. Not that
>>> we can't or shouldn't have these debates, of course. But I think the
>>> Seattle 2022 example -- where the IRV supporters were at fault! -- is
>>> exactly the opposite of what we want to happen. Overall support for the
>>> first part of the question -- the one that was essentially "should we scrap
>>> FPP?" was way lower than it would have been if there hadn't been confusion
>>> over competing proposals and the impression of a fractured reform community.
>>>
>>> I'm all for convincing people of the need for reform first and foremost
>>> and then convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you could argue
>>> that certain reforms would turn the public off the idea of structural
>>> change once and for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.
>>>
>>> On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:07 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-03-20 09:57, Michael Garman wrote:
>>>> > To be clear, I am by no means a believer that IRV is the only reform
>>>> > worth pursuing, or that it’s anywhere close to the perfect system.
>>>> >
>>>> > Where Michael and I disagree is on the role of pragmatism. I believe
>>>> > that any time an alternative to plurality voting is on the ballot,
>>>> > voters should support it. I think the folks in Eugene, Oregon, should
>>>> > vote yes on STAR. I think more places should try out approval. Beyond
>>>> > those three, I read this list because I enjoy learning about
>>>> completely
>>>> > new and different systems that would be fascinating to see in
>>>> practice
>>>> > somewhere one day. But in a place where citizens are asked for an up
>>>> or
>>>> > down vote on IRV vs. FPTP, I don’t see how you can defend voting for
>>>> the
>>>> > worst possible system because the proposed reform isn’t exactly what
>>>> > you’d like.
>>>>
>>>> What do you think about the following reasoning? Call it the "fool me
>>>> twice" problem.
>>>>
>>>> Suppose that a jurisdiction is considering switching from FPTP to
>>>> Borda.
>>>> The main organization is heavily marketing Borda as the one ranked
>>>> voting system, equating the ranked ballot format to Borda, the method.
>>>>
>>>> Meanwhile, an organization promoting MDDA (majority defeat
>>>> disqualification approval) is slowly growing. Someone (call him John)
>>>> favors MDDA and thinks that due to Borda's clone problem, it will
>>>> quickly be repealed. Then, he reasons, the jurisdiction will think that
>>>> ranking equals Borda, so that when some other ranked method is proposed
>>>> (MDDA, say), they will remember the failure of Borda that led to its
>>>> repeal and say "no; fool me twice, shame on me".
>>>>
>>>> Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a considerable chance
>>>> that Borda would be repealed if it were enacted, and a lesser chance
>>>> that MDDA would. Is then John in the right to withhold his support for
>>>> Borda? Would it be right for the MDDA organization to try to counter
>>>> the
>>>> Borda organization's marketing by saying more ranked methods exist,
>>>> even
>>>> if doing so reduces the chance that Borda is enacted?
>>>>
>>>> Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me twice problem is
>>>> likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's reasonable for someone who
>>>> thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can cause a backlash, to
>>>> not go for that method.
>>>>
>>>> -km
>>>>
>>> ----
>>
>>
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240325/564aa498/attachment-0001.htm>