<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><p>As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV, this is solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics imagination, bearing no connection to reality.</p></blockquote><div>No idea what this refers to, given STV isn't related to Arrow's theorem.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, the issue is the multi-stage method—the more elimination rounds you have, the more likely you are to have a negative voting weight event. Pretty much every sequential-loser method has the same problem.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> The Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is monotonic.<br></blockquote><div>That's also not correct; see Pukelsheim's book on apportionment for why every quota rule method is nonmonotonic. I do think <i>most</i> of STV's nonmonotonicity comes down to the IRV elimination, though.</div></div></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:39 PM Richard Lung <<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com">voting@ukscientists.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Exactly so, Michael Garman. opposition was incited against STV
because: You'll get a black mayor. <br>
</p>
<p>Indeed you would. The one or two communists elected by STV in NYC
were representing sweated labour in the textile industry. No
mention of the fact that abolishing STV gave one-party rule. In
NYC the Machine, Tammany Hall bankrupted the city, for the classic
reason of lack of opposition holding to account. The city machines
held "battering ram" referendums with the money and publicity on
side. They succumbed to the onslaught except in Cambridge with a
30,000 strong MIT, which had to endure 6 referendums in 16 years.
Such was the fanatical meal-ticket politics of the one-party
machines. STV had been promoted, despite politicians power-greed,
by mathematicians, who knew their business and weren't afraid of
"the key to democracy."<br>
</p>
<p>As for the profered non-monotonicity reason for abolishing STV,
this is solely in the Arrow-theorem-doctrinaire critics
imagination, bearing no connection to reality. The
non-monotonicity of STV just owes to it trailing a remnant of
plurality voting, in its "last past the post" exclusion count. The
Surplus transfer election count, especially Meek method, is
monotonic.</p>
<p>I have invented an STV exclusion count which is an iteration of
the election count; both therefore monotonic; a "scientific"
one-truth voting method, unlike other voting methods the world
uses. I posted programmers links, none of which, the list manager
has so far redeemed.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div>On 25/03/2024 17:18, Michael Garman
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">Much of the opposition to STV came from the fact
that it was electing — shudder! black people and even communists
— in a political climate where those were seen as two of the
worst traits a politician could have. That, more than
non-monotonicity, was what did it in in NYC and elsewhere. I
don’t find “reactionaries won’t like it” to be a convincing
argument against progress. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 6:08
PM Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">I'm all for convincing people of the
need for reform first and foremost and then
convincing them of specific methods later. Now, you
could argue that certain reforms would turn the
public off the idea of structural change once and
for all, and I'd take those concerns seriously.</div>
</blockquote>
<div>I don't think convincing people the current system
is bad is very helpful unless you have a better
alternative. People tend to flail about and pick the
first system they think of or hear about—like IRV—and
sometimes even pick a disastrous system like Borda.
After a state or city picks a new system, they usually
stick with it for decades out of pure inertia, meaning
it locks us out of systems that actually improve the
election's results. If nothing else, promoting these
systems wastes time and effort that could be
better-spent elsewhere.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's also easier to argue for a better policy than
a worse one. If reform movements didn't have so many
problems with Nobel-laureate economists and political
scientists writing newspaper articles and papers about
IRV not working that well, and didn't have major
disasters like Alaska's 2022 election to deal with,
things would probably be an easier sell.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's worth noting we have a case study of this.
During the Progressive Era in the 1910s, lots of US
cities adopted new voting systems, typically STV.
These rules survived only a few decades before repeal.
Most famously, in New York, STV caused so many
monotonicity failures that the city decided to kill
the only large-scale proportional representation
system in the United States after officials derided it
for being a lottery.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's taken 100 years for the electoral reform
movement to recover and get a second chance. I don't
want to wait another 100 years for a reform that might
actually stick this time.</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at
4:12 PM Michael Garman <<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us" target="_blank">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">>
Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me
twice problem is<br>
likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's
reasonable for someone who<br>
thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can
cause a backlash, to<br>
not go for that method.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For sure. It's a reasonable argument.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I think the principal consideration to bear in
mind is where the opposition is coming from and what
their arguments are. If I were an activist in a
community where the prevailing opinion was that
reform was necessary, I'd be all for having a debate
about the merits of different methods and the
relative logistical complications they might pose.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>My concern right now is that most people aren't
open to <i>any</i> reform, and if the public-facing
image they see is a reform movement that can't even
agree on a measure to push, they'll be even more
skeptical. Not that we can't or shouldn't have these
debates, of course. But I think the Seattle 2022
example -- where the IRV supporters were at fault!
-- is exactly the opposite of what we want to
happen. Overall support for the first part of the
question -- the one that was essentially "should we
scrap FPP?" was way lower than it would have been if
there hadn't been confusion over competing proposals
and the impression of a fractured reform community.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'm all for convincing people of the need for
reform first and foremost and then convincing them
of specific methods later. Now, you could argue that
certain reforms would turn the public off the idea
of structural change once and for all, and I'd take
those concerns seriously.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Mar 24, 2024
at 8:07 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On
2024-03-20 09:57, Michael Garman wrote:<br>
> To be clear, I am by no means a believer that
IRV is the only reform <br>
> worth pursuing, or that it’s anywhere close to
the perfect system.<br>
> <br>
> Where Michael and I disagree is on the role of
pragmatism. I believe <br>
> that any time an alternative to plurality
voting is on the ballot, <br>
> voters should support it. I think the folks in
Eugene, Oregon, should <br>
> vote yes on STAR. I think more places should
try out approval. Beyond <br>
> those three, I read this list because I enjoy
learning about completely <br>
> new and different systems that would be
fascinating to see in practice <br>
> somewhere one day. But in a place where
citizens are asked for an up or <br>
> down vote on IRV vs. FPTP, I don’t see how you
can defend voting for the <br>
> worst possible system because the proposed
reform isn’t exactly what <br>
> you’d like.<br>
<br>
What do you think about the following reasoning?
Call it the "fool me <br>
twice" problem.<br>
<br>
Suppose that a jurisdiction is considering switching
from FPTP to Borda. <br>
The main organization is heavily marketing Borda as
the one ranked <br>
voting system, equating the ranked ballot format to
Borda, the method.<br>
<br>
Meanwhile, an organization promoting MDDA (majority
defeat <br>
disqualification approval) is slowly growing.
Someone (call him John) <br>
favors MDDA and thinks that due to Borda's clone
problem, it will <br>
quickly be repealed. Then, he reasons, the
jurisdiction will think that <br>
ranking equals Borda, so that when some other ranked
method is proposed <br>
(MDDA, say), they will remember the failure of Borda
that led to its <br>
repeal and say "no; fool me twice, shame on me".<br>
<br>
Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a
considerable chance <br>
that Borda would be repealed if it were enacted, and
a lesser chance <br>
that MDDA would. Is then John in the right to
withhold his support for <br>
Borda? Would it be right for the MDDA organization
to try to counter the <br>
Borda organization's marketing by saying more ranked
methods exist, even <br>
if doing so reduces the chance that Borda is
enacted?<br>
<br>
Note that I'm not asking if you think the fool me
twice problem is <br>
likely to happen with IRV. Just whether it's
reasonable for someone who <br>
thinks enacting a (to his mind) flawed method can
cause a backlash, to <br>
not go for that method.<br>
<br>
-km<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br>
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<pre>----
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</pre>
</blockquote>
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</blockquote></div>