[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Not with monotonicity failure; a lot of ballots are going to rank bad
candidates above good ones as soon as the major parties figure this out and
start telling their supporters. From what I can tell, the best strategy for
most IRV elections in the US is raiding, i.e. ranking the worst candidate
of the opposite faction first.

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:44 PM Michael Garman <
michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:

> >> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
> including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>
> Not true. If there are only two candidates left — your favorite and your
> last choice — your vote counts for your favorite.
>
> If it’s either your second-to-last choice or your last, you by definition
> would rather have the former than the latter.
>
> :D
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:42 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Let me word more clearly the problem with what you’re trying to claim
>> that FairVote meant:
>>
>> If “your next choice” just means your next choice that remains
>> uneliminated when your favorite is eliminated, that could be anyone, all
>> the way down to your last choice.
>>
>> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
>> including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
>> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>>
>> Your “next choice” could be your 2nd choice, or any candidate all the way
>> down to your last choice.
>>
>> So then, by your strange definition, what you want to claim that FairVote
>> meant amounts to:
>>
>> “We guarantee that if your favorite doesn’t win, then someone you like
>> less will win.”
>>
>> :-D
>>
>> …but you already knew that. It’s no guarantee whatsoever.
>>
>> Why would FairVote mean that by something they say?
>>
>> They wouldn’t. They didn’t. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 05:52 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> I also don’t see a “like/dislike” binary as a useful way to approach
>>> this question. Let’s take the Joe/Jill/Donald three-way race we were
>>> discussing some ways back.
>>>
>>> I don’t care for Joe or Donald, but I’d much rather the former win than
>>> the latter, so I rank the three candidates 2-1-3 in the order I listed them
>>> above.  Joe wins, and even  though I dislike him, I’m pleased he won
>>> because the guy I dislike the most lost.
>>>
>>> You can’t guarantee that a candidate you “like” or feel warm and fuzzy
>>> about will win an election. That’s why no one ever tells a voter, “This
>>> method will only elect candidates you personally affirmatively like.” That
>>> would be absurd.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 1:44 PM Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> And where have they “lied” about that? Stated that your vote will never
>>>> count for anyone you dislike even if you rank them?
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 12:33 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:15 Michael Garman <
>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> > So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like
>>>>>> or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them. Your
>>>>>> vote only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank candidates you
>>>>>> don’t like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> That’s poor instrumental-strategy in Hare. Other than making a
>>>>> principled-statement by refusing to rank someone, you should rank all of
>>>>> the ones that you don’t like in order of preference. …because, by the time
>>>>> your vote reaches any of them, the ones that you like better are already
>>>>> gone. So you can only improve your outcome, when you rank all the way to
>>>>> the bottom.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway if you didn’t rank anyone below the candidates you like—say
>>>>> your 1st & 2nd choices— your unappealing guarantee doesn’t even apply.
>>>>>
>>>>> …&, when it does, it’s no guarantee at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> So the question becomes: Why did FairVote make the distinctly
>>>>> unappealing guarantee that you claim that they were making ??
>>>>>
>>>>> Answer: Of course they didn’t. Your latest story doesn’t hold up.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we
>>>>>>>> talk to real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some
>>>>>>>> folks online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for
>>>>>>>> “next highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like
>>>>>>> something that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big
>>>>>>> hole in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted
>>>>>>> audience interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or
>>>>>>> want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform
>>>>>>>> you like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
>>>>>>>> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an
>>>>>>>> Alaska voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I
>>>>>>>> ranked second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for
>>>>>>>> my first choice.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then yes.
>>>>>>>> That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of
>>>>>>>>>> evidence for your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you
>>>>>>>>>> prove that there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this many,
>>>>>>>>> many times.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s
>>>>>>>>> promotional-material, he’d find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV”
>>>>>>>>> doesn’t have a spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then
>>>>>>>>> your vote will count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Maybe.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or
>>>>>>>>> next choice then:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your
>>>>>>>>> 2nd choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, & transfers
>>>>>>>>> to the last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now your last
>>>>>>>>> choice has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated
>>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but
>>>>>>>>> try to evade by changing the subject.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an
>>>>>>>>> honest mistake.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform
>>>>>>>>> community have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he
>>>>>>>>> didn’t believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I
>>>>>>>>> asked her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year,
>>>>>>>>> but I don’t remember that detail.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>>>>>>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify
>>>>>>>>>> opposing a reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>>>>>>>> everywhere.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of
>>>>>>>>> enactment.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t
>>>>>>>>>> call yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior
>>>>>>>>>>>> system, because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting
>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the good. Shame on you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what
>>>>>>>>>>> they’re getting when they enact it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about
>>>>>>>>>>> what it is & will do.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty.
>>>>>>>>>>> But no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if
>>>>>>>>>>>>> voters know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that hope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments
>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>> be expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject
>>>>>>>>>>>>> “RCV”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> American thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too many votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reassign their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> got the most votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> many of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get him banned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clear he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with, and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understood it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enough not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they know of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that had
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> versions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  …though its merit &
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> referendum didn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite. They
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> & fully help
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that using
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elects the CW.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In particular,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> support from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mutual burial.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could lead to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for.   …& his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed as a serious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guy, which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> post that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not being timid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if so,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> joke is off the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> count, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people are more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (if IRV is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> buck category.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DSV" and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the small
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eventually blow up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> switched to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but you get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where he was being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that he was a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> head bitten
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BTR-IRV isn't that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightly more complexity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resistance and do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a city that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also how much
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in many RCV
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> poll workers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> easier it would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> workers get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "vaguely makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to keep track
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are admittedly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this count.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both cases it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> card, even with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for storage
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again ties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> order to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV sankey
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps aren't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they're there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with computers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a limit to how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they can throw
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computers in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have given up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prefer to do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heavily "math
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literate", and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hard time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "if more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be elected".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem, then that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> summability and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time) is a big
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> night) to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lead over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections desk to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> polling
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fear we're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since 2011 and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> surprise me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia does it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like largest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is becoming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expected pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election is going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The topic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> founders of FairVote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote will get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do better,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but his match
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this region
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how X's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issue that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking slim
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Who the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being shored up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indecisive and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alter the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the von
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strengths of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A>B>C, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that getting B
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a 60% of C.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the one for A
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and A is 10,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them. So that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> variables - the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by approving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utility) Approval,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deal over a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
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