[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Garman]

>> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
“next choice” as you want to define that phrase.

Not true. If there are only two candidates left — your favorite and your
last choice — your vote counts for your favorite.

If it’s either your second-to-last choice or your last, you by definition
would rather have the former than the latter.

:D

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:42 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Let me word more clearly the problem with what you’re trying to claim that
> FairVote meant:
>
> If “your next choice” just means your next choice that remains
> uneliminated when your favorite is eliminated, that could be anyone, all
> the way down to your last choice.
>
> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
> including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>
> Your “next choice” could be your 2nd choice, or any candidate all the way
> down to your last choice.
>
> So then, by your strange definition, what you want to claim that FairVote
> meant amounts to:
>
> “We guarantee that if your favorite doesn’t win, then someone you like
> less will win.”
>
> :-D
>
> …but you already knew that. It’s no guarantee whatsoever.
>
> Why would FairVote mean that by something they say?
>
> They wouldn’t. They didn’t. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 05:52 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> I also don’t see a “like/dislike” binary as a useful way to approach this
>> question. Let’s take the Joe/Jill/Donald three-way race we were discussing
>> some ways back.
>>
>> I don’t care for Joe or Donald, but I’d much rather the former win than
>> the latter, so I rank the three candidates 2-1-3 in the order I listed them
>> above.  Joe wins, and even  though I dislike him, I’m pleased he won
>> because the guy I dislike the most lost.
>>
>> You can’t guarantee that a candidate you “like” or feel warm and fuzzy
>> about will win an election. That’s why no one ever tells a voter, “This
>> method will only elect candidates you personally affirmatively like.” That
>> would be absurd.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 1:44 PM Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> And where have they “lied” about that? Stated that your vote will never
>>> count for anyone you dislike even if you rank them?
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 12:33 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:15 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> > So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like
>>>>> or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>
>>>>> No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them. Your
>>>>> vote only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank candidates you
>>>>> don’t like.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> That’s poor instrumental-strategy in Hare. Other than making a
>>>> principled-statement by refusing to rank someone, you should rank all of
>>>> the ones that you don’t like in order of preference. …because, by the time
>>>> your vote reaches any of them, the ones that you like better are already
>>>> gone. So you can only improve your outcome, when you rank all the way to
>>>> the bottom.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway if you didn’t rank anyone below the candidates you like—say your
>>>> 1st & 2nd choices— your unappealing guarantee doesn’t even apply.
>>>>
>>>> …&, when it does, it’s no guarantee at all.
>>>>
>>>> So the question becomes: Why did FairVote make the distinctly
>>>> unappealing guarantee that you claim that they were making ??
>>>>
>>>> Answer: Of course they didn’t. Your latest story doesn’t hold up.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we talk
>>>>>>> to real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some
>>>>>>> folks online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for
>>>>>>> “next highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like
>>>>>> something that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big
>>>>>> hole in it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted
>>>>>> audience interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or
>>>>>> want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>
>>>>>> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform
>>>>>>> you like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
>>>>>>> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an
>>>>>>> Alaska voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I
>>>>>>> ranked second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for
>>>>>>> my first choice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then yes.
>>>>>>> That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of
>>>>>>>>> evidence for your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you
>>>>>>>>> prove that there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this many,
>>>>>>>> many times.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s promotional-material,
>>>>>>>> he’d find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV” doesn’t have a
>>>>>>>> spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then your vote will
>>>>>>>> count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Maybe.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or
>>>>>>>> next choice then:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your
>>>>>>>> 2nd choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, & transfers
>>>>>>>> to the last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now your last
>>>>>>>> choice has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated
>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but try
>>>>>>>> to evade by changing the subject.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an
>>>>>>>> honest mistake.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform
>>>>>>>> community have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he
>>>>>>>> didn’t believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I
>>>>>>>> asked her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year,
>>>>>>>> but I don’t remember that detail.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>>>>>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify opposing
>>>>>>>>> a reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>>>>>>> everywhere.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of
>>>>>>>> enactment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t call
>>>>>>>>> yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior
>>>>>>>>>>> system, because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting
>>>>>>>>>>> exactly what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of
>>>>>>>>>>> the good. Shame on you.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what
>>>>>>>>>> they’re getting when they enact it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about
>>>>>>>>>> what it is & will do.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty.
>>>>>>>>>> But no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if
>>>>>>>>>>>> voters know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against
>>>>>>>>>>>> that hope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments
>>>>>>>>>>>> based on an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>> be expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject
>>>>>>>>>>>> “RCV”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> American thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got too
>>>>>>>>>>>>> many votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many
>>>>>>>>>>>>> votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> just keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reassign their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever
>>>>>>>>>>>>> got the most votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric
>>>>>>>>>>>>> means isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> many of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get him banned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clear he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with, and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understood it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enough not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that had
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> versions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.   …though
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its merit &
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite. They
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> & fully help
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that using
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elects the CW.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In particular,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> support from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine mutual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burial.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could lead to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for.   …& his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed as a serious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next guy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> post that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not being timid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if so,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your joke
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is off the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> count, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people are more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed (if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the buck
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DSV" and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the small
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eventually blow up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> switched to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but you get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995, where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he was being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that he was a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> head bitten
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BTR-IRV isn't that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightly more complexity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resistance and do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> city that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also how much
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in many RCV
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> poll workers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> easier it would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> workers get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for "vaguely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep track
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are admittedly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this count.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In both
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cases it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD card,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> storage
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again ties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> order to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time IRV
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sankey
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps aren't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with computers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limit to how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they can throw
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computers in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have given up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prefer to do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heavily "math
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literate", and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hard time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "if more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be elected".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem, then that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> summability and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time) is a big
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> night) to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lead over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the elections
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> desk to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> polling
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fear we're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco since
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2011 and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> surprise me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how Australia
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like largest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becoming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expected pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The topic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the founders
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of FairVote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote will get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do better,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his match
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this region
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> X's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some issue
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking slim
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Who the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shored up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indecisive and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alter the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the von
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have strengths
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A>B>C, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that getting B
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 60% of C.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one for A
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and A is 10,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them. So that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> variables - the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by approving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utility) Approval,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deal over a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
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