[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.
Michael Garman
michael.garman at rankthevote.us
Wed Mar 20 15:02:33 PDT 2024
And FairVote is not “my organization.” I do not, nor have I ever,
volunteered or worked for pay for that organization.
On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:01 PM Michael Garman <
michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
> >> Irrelevant
>
> Not at all. Your claim is that FairVote is misleading people by not
> letting on that there’s a scenario in which their vote will count for their
> least favorite candidate, which simply isn’t true.
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:00 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 14:44 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> >> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to
>>> & including your 2nd-to-last choice. …thereby making your last choice your
>>> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>>>
>>> Not true. If there are only two candidates left — your favorite and your
>>> last choice — your vote counts for your favorite.
>>>
>>> If it’s either your second-to-last choice or your last, you by
>>> definition would rather have the former than the latter.
>>>
>>
>> Irrelevant. By your bizarrely contorted definition of “next choice”, your
>> last choice would then be your “next choice”.
>>
>> So, as I said, your interpretation of the guarantee reality only
>> guarantees that if your favorite doesn’t win, someone worse will win.
>>
>> Not a guarantee that FairVote would make. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>>
>> You can & will forever keep trying to wiggle-worm out of that. I don’t
>> have the time to continue this farce.
>>
>> You don’t want me to use the “C”-word, so I won’t. But the astoundingly
>> boundless unquestioning loyalty that you display, with your hilarious
>> contortions to try to exonerate your…organization, is a perfect
>> demonstration of why I used the “C”-word to refer to it.
>>
>> You’d keep trying to squirm out of it for as long as anyone is willing to
>> waste their time talking to you.
>>
>> I don’t have time for this. This conversation is concluded.
>>
>>>
>>> :D
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:42 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Let me word more clearly the problem with what you’re trying to claim
>>>> that FairVote meant:
>>>>
>>>> If “your next choice” just means your next choice that remains
>>>> uneliminated when your favorite is eliminated, that could be anyone, all
>>>> the way down to your last choice.
>>>>
>>>> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
>>>> including your 2nd-to-last choice. …thereby making your last choice your
>>>> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>>>>
>>>> Your “next choice” could be your 2nd choice, or any candidate all the
>>>> way down to your last choice.
>>>>
>>>> So then, by your strange definition, what you want to claim that
>>>> FairVote meant amounts to:
>>>>
>>>> “We guarantee that if your favorite doesn’t win, then someone you like
>>>> less will win.”
>>>>
>>>> :-D
>>>>
>>>> …but you already knew that. It’s no guarantee whatsoever.
>>>>
>>>> Why would FairVote mean that by something they say?
>>>>
>>>> They wouldn’t. They didn’t. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 05:52 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I also don’t see a “like/dislike” binary as a useful way to approach
>>>>> this question. Let’s take the Joe/Jill/Donald three-way race we were
>>>>> discussing some ways back.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don’t care for Joe or Donald, but I’d much rather the former win
>>>>> than the latter, so I rank the three candidates 2-1-3 in the order I listed
>>>>> them above. Joe wins, and even though I dislike him, I’m pleased he won
>>>>> because the guy I dislike the most lost.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can’t guarantee that a candidate you “like” or feel warm and fuzzy
>>>>> about will win an election. That’s why no one ever tells a voter, “This
>>>>> method will only elect candidates you personally affirmatively like.” That
>>>>> would be absurd.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 1:44 PM Michael Garman <
>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> And where have they “lied” about that? Stated that your vote will
>>>>>> never count for anyone you dislike even if you rank them?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 12:33 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:15 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you
>>>>>>>> like or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones, that
>>>>>>>> you don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them.
>>>>>>>> Your vote only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank
>>>>>>>> candidates you don’t like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That’s poor instrumental-strategy in Hare. Other than making a
>>>>>>> principled-statement by refusing to rank someone, you should rank all of
>>>>>>> the ones that you don’t like in order of preference. …because, by the time
>>>>>>> your vote reaches any of them, the ones that you like better are already
>>>>>>> gone. So you can only improve your outcome, when you rank all the way to
>>>>>>> the bottom.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Anyway if you didn’t rank anyone below the candidates you like—say
>>>>>>> your 1st & 2nd choices— your unappealing guarantee doesn’t even apply.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …&, when it does, it’s no guarantee at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So the question becomes: Why did FairVote make the distinctly
>>>>>>> unappealing guarantee that you claim that they were making ??
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Answer: Of course they didn’t. Your latest story doesn’t hold up.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next or 2nd choice
>>>>>>>>>> *among the un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we
>>>>>>>>>> talk to real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some
>>>>>>>>>> folks online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for
>>>>>>>>>> “next highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like
>>>>>>>>> something that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big
>>>>>>>>> hole in it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted
>>>>>>>>> audience interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like
>>>>>>>>> or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones, that you
>>>>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he
>>>>>>>>>> also promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches
>>>>>>>>>> credibility.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a
>>>>>>>>>> reform you like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the
>>>>>>>>>> other. This isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise
>>>>>>>>>> has happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington &
>>>>>>>>>> Alaska.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an
>>>>>>>>>> Alaska voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I
>>>>>>>>>> ranked second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for
>>>>>>>>>> my first choice.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then
>>>>>>>>>> yes. That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of
>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence for your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you
>>>>>>>>>>>> prove that there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this
>>>>>>>>>>> many, many times.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s
>>>>>>>>>>> promotional-material, he’d find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV”
>>>>>>>>>>> doesn’t have a spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then
>>>>>>>>>>> your vote will count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next or 2nd choice
>>>>>>>>>>> *among the un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or
>>>>>>>>>>> next choice then:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your
>>>>>>>>>>> 2nd choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, &
>>>>>>>>>>> transfers to the last remaining candidate, your last choice, tthen now
>>>>>>>>>>> your last choice has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated
>>>>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but
>>>>>>>>>>> try to evade by changing the subject.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an
>>>>>>>>>>> honest mistake.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform
>>>>>>>>>>> community have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he
>>>>>>>>>>> also promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the
>>>>>>>>>>> lie.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he
>>>>>>>>>>> didn’t believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I
>>>>>>>>>>> asked her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year,
>>>>>>>>>>> but I don’t remember that detail.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise
>>>>>>>>>>> has happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington &
>>>>>>>>>>> Alaska.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify
>>>>>>>>>>>> opposing a reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of
>>>>>>>>>>> enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t
>>>>>>>>>>>> call yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system, because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the good. Shame on you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what
>>>>>>>>>>>>> they’re getting when they enact it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about
>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it is & will do.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>>> honesty. But no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if voters know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against that hope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject “RCV”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doubt you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> American thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too many votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equal-ranking, what "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the description I gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never going to be a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> willing to delegate details to mathematicians and economists, as long as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they understand why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> give an overview.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reassign their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> got the most votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> handles top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it, so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometric means isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below. In short, I'm still
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty sure Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though many of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would get him banned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes clear he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with, and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understood it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tough enough not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they know of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that had
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> versions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I offer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> …though its merit &
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> necessary that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> referendum didn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite. They
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> express & fully help
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that using
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say that, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always elects the CW.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In particular,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any support from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mutual burial.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could lead to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy, which has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy for. …& his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed as a serious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guy, which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his post that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RCV’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate not being timid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if so,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> joke is off the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point, so I think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more reason to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible. A system that "computers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can count, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people are more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> local elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doubt you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (if IRV is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failed).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> handles top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it, so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> buck category.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "manual DSV" and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the small
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eventually blow up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> switched to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but you get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad. Michael is frequently annoying, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he's frequently
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > correct. This mailing list was started in large part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where he was being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list. I thought I'd be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> show that he was a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > crank. Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my head bitten
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BTR-IRV isn't that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightly more complexity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resistance and do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a city that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > security. I appreciated how much process there was, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also how much
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, so I didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voted in many RCV
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> poll workers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> easier it would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> workers get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "vaguely makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to keep track
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time". Strict Condorcet methods
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are admittedly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count. Approval is drop-dead simple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on this count.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Summability primarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both cases it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> card, even with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for storage
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again ties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first order to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV sankey
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps aren't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they're there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> good with computers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to say. Computers are taking over the world, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's a limit to how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > computers. Many people "trust" computers only as far as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they can throw
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter. Granted, it's possible to wire up many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computers in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants. Most people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have given up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> robot overlords
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prefer to do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves. :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heavily "math
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literate", and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a hard time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> areas:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> real.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> safeguarding step follows directly from your concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "if more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not be elected".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem, then that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> summability and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time) is a big
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > problem. I think it's important for voters (on election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> night) to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> took the lead over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > CandA. Let's turn it over to our analysts at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections desk to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!" The pre-election polling and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exit polling
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I fear we're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since 2011 and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't surprise me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ought to do it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia does it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like largest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is becoming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> up the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Australia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expected pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pairwise reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote. Ultimately, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election is going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RCV. The topic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people truly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> founders of FairVote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate. I'm hopeful that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote will get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should do better,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but his match
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is this region
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how X's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issue that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking slim
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contest. Who the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being shored up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indecisive and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alter the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the von
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particular rating in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strengths of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A>B>C, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that getting B
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a 60% of C.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the one for A
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> zero and A is 10,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them. So that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> variables - the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works by approving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scale, then there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically normalize
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utility) Approval,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deal over a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of preference".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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