[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

Wed Mar 20 15:01:45 PDT 2024

 >> Irrelevant

Not at all. Your claim is that FairVote is misleading people by not letting
on that there’s a scenario in which their vote will count for their least
favorite candidate, which simply isn’t true.

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:00 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 14:44 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> >> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
>> including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
>> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>>
>> Not true. If there are only two candidates left — your favorite and your
>> last choice — your vote counts for your favorite.
>>
>> If it’s either your second-to-last choice or your last, you by definition
>> would rather have the former than the latter.
>>
>
> Irrelevant. By your bizarrely contorted definition of “next choice”, your
> last choice would then be your “next choice”.
>
> So, as I said, your interpretation of the guarantee reality only
> guarantees that if your favorite doesn’t win, someone worse will win.
>
> Not a guarantee that FairVote would make. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>
> You can & will forever keep trying to wiggle-worm out of that. I don’t
> have the time to continue this farce.
>
> You don’t want me to use the “C”-word, so I won’t. But the astoundingly
> boundless unquestioning loyalty that you display, with your hilarious
> contortions to try to exonerate your…organization, is a perfect
> demonstration of why I used the “C”-word to refer to it.
>
> You’d keep trying to squirm out of it for as long as anyone is willing to
> waste their time talking to you.
>
> I don’t have time for this. This conversation is concluded.
>
>>
>> :D
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:42 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Let me word more clearly the problem with what you’re trying to claim
>>> that FairVote meant:
>>>
>>> If “your next choice” just means your next choice that remains
>>> uneliminated when your favorite is eliminated, that could be anyone, all
>>> the way down to your last choice.
>>>
>>> Your favorite could be popular enough to eliminate everyone down to &
>>> including your 2nd-to-last choice.  …thereby making your last choice your
>>> “next choice” as you want to define that phrase.
>>>
>>> Your “next choice” could be your 2nd choice, or any candidate all the
>>> way down to your last choice.
>>>
>>> So then, by your strange definition, what you want to claim that
>>> FairVote meant amounts to:
>>>
>>> “We guarantee that if your favorite doesn’t win, then someone you like
>>> less will win.”
>>>
>>> :-D
>>>
>>> …but you already knew that. It’s no guarantee whatsoever.
>>>
>>> Why would FairVote mean that by something they say?
>>>
>>> They wouldn’t. They didn’t. Your story doesn’t hold up.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 05:52 Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I also don’t see a “like/dislike” binary as a useful way to approach
>>>> this question. Let’s take the Joe/Jill/Donald three-way race we were
>>>> discussing some ways back.
>>>>
>>>> I don’t care for Joe or Donald, but I’d much rather the former win than
>>>> the latter, so I rank the three candidates 2-1-3 in the order I listed them
>>>> above.  Joe wins, and even  though I dislike him, I’m pleased he won
>>>> because the guy I dislike the most lost.
>>>>
>>>> You can’t guarantee that a candidate you “like” or feel warm and fuzzy
>>>> about will win an election. That’s why no one ever tells a voter, “This
>>>> method will only elect candidates you personally affirmatively like.” That
>>>> would be absurd.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 1:44 PM Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> And where have they “lied” about that? Stated that your vote will
>>>>> never count for anyone you dislike even if you rank them?
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 12:33 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:15 Michael Garman <
>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like
>>>>>>> or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them.
>>>>>>> Your vote only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank
>>>>>>> candidates you don’t like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> That’s poor instrumental-strategy in Hare. Other than making a
>>>>>> principled-statement by refusing to rank someone, you should rank all of
>>>>>> the ones that you don’t like in order of preference. …because, by the time
>>>>>> your vote reaches any of them, the ones that you like better are already
>>>>>> gone. So you can only improve your outcome, when you rank all the way to
>>>>>> the bottom.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway if you didn’t rank anyone below the candidates you like—say
>>>>>> your 1st & 2nd choices— your unappealing guarantee doesn’t even apply.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …&, when it does, it’s no guarantee at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So the question becomes: Why did FairVote make the distinctly
>>>>>> unappealing guarantee that you claim that they were making ??
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Answer: Of course they didn’t. Your latest story doesn’t hold up.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we
>>>>>>>>> talk to real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some
>>>>>>>>> folks online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for
>>>>>>>>> “next highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like
>>>>>>>> something that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big
>>>>>>>> hole in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted
>>>>>>>> audience interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like
>>>>>>>> or want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>>>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he
>>>>>>>>> also promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform
>>>>>>>>> you like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
>>>>>>>>> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise
>>>>>>>>> has happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington &
>>>>>>>>> Alaska.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an
>>>>>>>>> Alaska voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I
>>>>>>>>> ranked second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for
>>>>>>>>> my first choice.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then
>>>>>>>>> yes. That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of
>>>>>>>>>>> evidence for your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you
>>>>>>>>>>> prove that there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this
>>>>>>>>>> many, many times.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s
>>>>>>>>>> promotional-material, he’d find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV”
>>>>>>>>>> doesn’t have a spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then
>>>>>>>>>> your vote will count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Maybe.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or
>>>>>>>>>> next choice then:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your
>>>>>>>>>> 2nd choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, &
>>>>>>>>>> transfers to the last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now
>>>>>>>>>> your last choice has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated
>>>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but
>>>>>>>>>> try to evade by changing the subject.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an
>>>>>>>>>> honest mistake.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform
>>>>>>>>>> community have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he
>>>>>>>>>> didn’t believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I
>>>>>>>>>> asked her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>>>>>>>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year,
>>>>>>>>>> but I don’t remember that detail.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>>>>>>>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify
>>>>>>>>>>> opposing a reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>>>>>>>>> everywhere.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of
>>>>>>>>>> enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t
>>>>>>>>>>> call yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior
>>>>>>>>>>>>> system, because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the good. Shame on you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what
>>>>>>>>>>>> they’re getting when they enact it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about
>>>>>>>>>>>> what it is & will do.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>> honesty. But no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voters know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that hope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> “RCV”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> American thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too many votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reassign their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> got the most votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty sure Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though many of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get him banned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> becomes clear he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with, and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understood it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enough not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they know of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that had
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> versions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I offer,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  …though its merit &
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> referendum didn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite. They
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> express & fully help
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that using
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say that, with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elects the CW.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In particular,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any support from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mutual burial.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could lead to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy, which has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy for.   …& his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed as a serious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guy, which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> post that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RCV’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate not being timid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who propose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if so,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> joke is off the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more reason to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> count, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people are more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you could go
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (if IRV is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failed).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better). I suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an average
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> buck category.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "manual DSV" and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the small
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eventually blow up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> switched to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but you get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where he was being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that he was a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> head bitten
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BTR-IRV isn't that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightly more complexity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resistance and do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a city that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also how much
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so I didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> voted in many RCV
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> poll workers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> easier it would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> workers get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "vaguely makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to keep track
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are admittedly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this count.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Summability primarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both cases it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> card, even with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for storage
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again ties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> order to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV sankey
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps aren't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they're there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with computers
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a limit to how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they can throw
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computers in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have given up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prefer to do away
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models call
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heavily "math
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literate", and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a hard time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> real.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that "if more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be elected".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem, then that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> summability and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time) is a big
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> night) to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lead over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elections desk to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exit polling
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I fear we're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since 2011 and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't surprise me
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia does it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like largest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is becoming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> up the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Australia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expected pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pairwise reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> election is going to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RCV.  The topic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people truly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> founders of FairVote
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote will get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should do better,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but his match
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is this region
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how X's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issue that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking slim
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contest. Who the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being shored up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indecisive and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alter the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the von
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particular rating in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strengths of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A>B>C, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that getting B
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a 60% of C.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the one for A
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and A is 10,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> getting a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them. So that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> variables - the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by approving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scale, then there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically normalize
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utility) Approval,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deal over a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of preference".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://electorama.com/em for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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