[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Garman]

I have been a poll worker. I know what I’m talking about.

> That doesn't say shit.  So is FPTP.

That’s the point — it’s just as secure.

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:56 PM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 03/20/2024 3:27 PM EDT Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Do “general trends” explain the discrepancy in levels of representation
> between IRV and non-IRV cities with similar characteristics?
> >
>
> You need to learn how to do Bayesian inference.  RCV hasn't been around
> for long in the U.S., except for Cambridge MA.  All over the U.S.
> representation of POC has increased, not just some of the few places where
> RCV has existed for less than a decade.  Most scholars are crediting that
> to single-member districts in the South, which prevented corrupt
> legislators from drawing lines splitting the Black vote without the
> districts appearing gerrymandered.
>
> But if I roll a pair of dice once or twice and I get two ones both times,
> do I conclude that the dice is weighted?
>
> > IRV is compatible with risk limiting audits.
>
> That doesn't say shit.  So is FPTP.
>
> > Some people will always cry fraud when they lose, but IRV can be audited
> rigorously.
>
> Not like FPTP nor like Condorcet can be audited.  In Alaska in November
> 2022, they didn't announce results until the day before Thanksgiving.  No
> one knew who won until then.
>
> There are no redundant data paths where other interested parties, namely
> the media and the competing campaigns, can get the raw numbers from the
> polling places and simply *add* those numbers up and see who wins.
>
> This is something we have right now with FPTP and we lose it with IRV
> because IRV is not precinct summable.
>
> Again, what if Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger was corrupt
> like apparently Jeffrey Clark is?  What prevents someone at the
> single-point-of-failure from surreptitiously padding (or subtracting)
> tallies of the vote in a close election to swing the outcome to a different
> candidate?  What prevents that, what keeps honest people honest, is that
> these tallies are already published on the night of the election at the
> polling places.  If they are changed significantly, people will get
> suspicious.  If they are changed enough that the outcome of the election is
> changed, then people will focus on the very cities and polling places where
> numbers are disparate and sealed ballot bags are opened.
>
> Precinct Summability is necessary to do that.  Precinct Summability is a
> property we make use of, right now, with FPTP.  And we lose it with IRV.
> And then IRV doesn't scale well when it goes statewide.  How do they
> centralize the ballot data securely and quickly enough that conspiracy
> theorists cannot call out as suspicious?  How do we find out who wins (or
> is expected to win) on election night in a statewide election?  We find out
> by adding up numbers that we learn that are published at each polling place
> on the evening of the election after the polls close.
>
> Mr. Garman, I suggest you might consider doing some work as a poll worker
> or even as an elected polling official.  I have done both.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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