[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Garman]

> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or want
are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you don’t
like, will get your vote.”

No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them. Your vote
only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank candidates you
don’t like.




On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice *among
>>  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>
>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we talk to
>> real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some folks
>> online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for “next
>> highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>
>
>
> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like something
> that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big hole in it.
>
> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted audience
> interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>
> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or want
> are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you don’t
> like, will get your vote.”
>
> :-D
>
> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>
>
>
>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>
>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>
>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>>
>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>
>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform you
>> like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
>> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>
>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>
>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an Alaska
>> voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I ranked
>> second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for my
>> first choice.
>>
>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>
>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>
>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then yes.
>> That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of evidence for
>>>> your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you prove that
>>>> there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this many,
>>> many times.
>>>
>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s promotional-material, he’d
>>> find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV” doesn’t have a
>>> spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then your vote will
>>> count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>
>>> Maybe.
>>>
>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>
>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>
>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>
>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice *among
>>>  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>
>>> :-D
>>>
>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>
>>>
>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or next
>>> choice then:
>>>
>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your 2nd
>>> choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>
>>>
>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, & transfers to
>>> the last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now your last choice
>>> has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>
>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated candidates.
>>>
>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but try to
>>> evade by changing the subject.
>>>
>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an honest
>>> mistake.
>>>
>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform community
>>> have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>
>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>
>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>
>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>>
>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>
>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he didn’t
>>> believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>
>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I asked
>>> her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>
>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year, but I
>>> don’t remember that detail.
>>>
>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>
>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>
>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>
>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify opposing a
>>>> reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>
>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>
>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>> everywhere.
>>>
>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of enactment.
>>>
>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t call
>>>> yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>
>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior system,
>>>>>> because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting exactly
>>>>>> what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
>>>>>> Shame on you.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what they’re
>>>>> getting when they enact it.
>>>>>
>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about what it
>>>>> is & will do.
>>>>>
>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty. But
>>>>> no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>
>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if voters
>>>>>>> know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against that
>>>>>>> hope.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments based on
>>>>>>> an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t be
>>>>>>> expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject “RCV”.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>>>>> values,
>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>>>>> works.
>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an American
>>>>>>>> thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got too many
>>>>>>>> votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong with
>>>>>>>> Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many votes."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it just
>>>>>>>> keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates, reassign
>>>>>>>> their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever got the
>>>>>>>> most votes."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method.
>>>>>>>>> It's
>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works.
>>>>>>>>> Over
>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>>>>> favor
>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric means
>>>>>>>> isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty sure
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though many
>>>>>>>>> of his
>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would get
>>>>>>>>> him banned
>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes clear
>>>>>>>>> he's
>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal with,
>>>>>>>>> and that
>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing methods.
>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff below".)
>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I understood it)
>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising failure,
>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough enough
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as they know
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method that had
>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions
>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer,
>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.   …though its
>>>>>>>>> merit &
>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum
>>>>>>>>> didn’t
>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite.
>>>>>>>>> They
>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express &
>>>>>>>>> fully help
>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me that
>>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a burial
>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say that,
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always elects
>>>>>>>>> the CW.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>>>>> particular,
>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any
>>>>>>>>> support from
>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine mutual
>>>>>>>>> burial.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it, and
>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and could
>>>>>>>>> lead to
>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose and
>>>>>>>>> enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore
>>>>>>>>> Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of every
>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy, which
>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy for.
>>>>>>>>>  …& his
>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he expressed
>>>>>>>>> as a serious
>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next guy,
>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his post
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate not
>>>>>>>>> being timid
>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates who
>>>>>>>>> propose
>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't". But if
>>>>>>>>> so,
>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your joke is
>>>>>>>>> off the
>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point, so I
>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more
>>>>>>>>> reason to
>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even if
>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can count,
>>>>>>>>> even if
>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because people are
>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>>>>> values,
>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>>>>> works.
>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust a
>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for good
>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed (if IRV
>>>>>>>>> is to
>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method.
>>>>>>>>> It's
>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works.
>>>>>>>>> Over
>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>>>>> favor
>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the buck
>>>>>>>>> category.
>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per candidate,
>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because the
>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual DSV"
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed that
>>>>>>>>> they have
>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that the
>>>>>>>>> small
>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will eventually
>>>>>>>>> blow up.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't been
>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area switched to
>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections, but you
>>>>>>>>> get
>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part because of
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995, where he
>>>>>>>>> was being
>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show that
>>>>>>>>> he was a
>>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You should
>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and that I
>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my head
>>>>>>>>> bitten
>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then BTR-IRV
>>>>>>>>> isn't that
>>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of slightly
>>>>>>>>> more complexity
>>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy resistance
>>>>>>>>> and do away
>>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in a city
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but also
>>>>>>>>> how much
>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here, so I
>>>>>>>>> didn't
>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted in
>>>>>>>>> many RCV
>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for poll
>>>>>>>>> workers.
>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the easier
>>>>>>>>> it would
>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll workers get
>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for "vaguely
>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result to keep
>>>>>>>>> track
>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods are
>>>>>>>>> admittedly
>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on this
>>>>>>>>> count.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In both
>>>>>>>>> cases it's
>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD card, even
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not for
>>>>>>>>> storage
>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which again
>>>>>>>>> ties
>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first order
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time IRV
>>>>>>>>> sankey
>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious steps
>>>>>>>>> aren't
>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why they're
>>>>>>>>> there.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good with
>>>>>>>>> computers
>>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's a
>>>>>>>>> limit to how
>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as they
>>>>>>>>> can throw
>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many computers
>>>>>>>>> in a
>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that a
>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people have
>>>>>>>>> given up
>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may prefer to
>>>>>>>>> do away
>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language models
>>>>>>>>> call
>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews heavily
>>>>>>>>> "math
>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer literate",
>>>>>>>>> and I
>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have a
>>>>>>>>> hard time
>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept that
>>>>>>>>> "if more
>>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not be
>>>>>>>>> elected".
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a problem,
>>>>>>>>> then that
>>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that summability and
>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real time)
>>>>>>>>> is a big
>>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election night)
>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took the
>>>>>>>>> lead over
>>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the elections desk
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit
>>>>>>>>> polling
>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I fear
>>>>>>>>> we're
>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't understand
>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco since 2011
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't
>>>>>>>>> surprise me
>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if
>>>>>>>>> you're
>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought to do
>>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how Australia does
>>>>>>>>> it?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more like
>>>>>>>>> largest
>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting is
>>>>>>>>> becoming
>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank the
>>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between the
>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up the
>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical expected
>>>>>>>>> pairwise
>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of getting
>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I think
>>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the election is
>>>>>>>>> going to
>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I don't
>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.  The
>>>>>>>>> topic
>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people truly
>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the founders of
>>>>>>>>> FairVote
>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that FairVote
>>>>>>>>> will get
>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so that they
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should do
>>>>>>>>> better,
>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ, but his
>>>>>>>>> match
>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is this
>>>>>>>>> region
>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X because of
>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple rules
>>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the strength
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about how X's
>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some issue that
>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is looking
>>>>>>>>> slim
>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest. Who
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either being
>>>>>>>>> shored up
>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although indecisive
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know of any
>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would have
>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could alter
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an unpredictable
>>>>>>>>> mess.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in the
>>>>>>>>> von
>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular
>>>>>>>>> rating in
>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have strengths of
>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what others are
>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is A>B>C,
>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify strength of
>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think that
>>>>>>>>> getting B
>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and a 60%
>>>>>>>>> of C.
>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of the one
>>>>>>>>> for A
>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero and A
>>>>>>>>> is 10,
>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as getting
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of them. So
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of preference
>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent with
>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free variables -
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are still
>>>>>>>>> multiple
>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works by
>>>>>>>>> approving
>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale, then
>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite candidate
>>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now there is
>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean utility)
>>>>>>>>> Approval,
>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure deal
>>>>>>>>> over a
>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The point
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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