[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice *among
>  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>
> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we talk to
> real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some folks
> online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for “next
> highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>


Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like something
that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big hole in it.

If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted audience
interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.

So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or want
are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you don’t
like, will get your vote.”

:-D

“Oh the tangled webs we weave…”



> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>
> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
> promised to publicly retract it.)
>
> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>
> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>
> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform you
> like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>
> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>
> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an Alaska
> voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I ranked
> second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for my
> first choice.
>
> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>
> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>
> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then yes. That’s
> how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of evidence for
>>> your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you prove that
>>> there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>
>>
>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this many,
>> many times.
>>
>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s promotional-material, he’d
>> find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV” doesn’t have a
>> spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then your vote will
>> count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>
>> Maybe.
>>
>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>
>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>
>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>
>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice *among
>>  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>
>> :-D
>>
>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>
>>
>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or next
>> choice then:
>>
>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your 2nd
>> choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>
>>
>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, & transfers to the
>> last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now your last choice has
>> become your 1st choice !!!
>>
>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated candidates.
>>
>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but try to
>> evade by changing the subject.
>>
>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an honest
>> mistake.
>>
>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform community have
>> been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>
>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>
>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>
>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>
>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>
>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he didn’t
>> believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>
>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I asked her.
>> She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform enactment-organizations,
>> in New Orleans.
>>
>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year, but I
>> don’t remember that detail.
>>
>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>
>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>
>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>
>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>
>>
>>
>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify opposing a
>>> reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>
>>
>>
>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>
>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>
>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>> everywhere.
>>
>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of enactment.
>>
>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t call
>>> yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>
>>
>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>
>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior system,
>>>>> because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting exactly
>>>>> what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
>>>>> Shame on you.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>
>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what they’re
>>>> getting when they enact it.
>>>>
>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about what it
>>>> is & will do.
>>>>
>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty. But
>>>> no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>
>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>
>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if voters
>>>>>> know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against that
>>>>>> hope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments based on
>>>>>> an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t be
>>>>>> expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject “RCV”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>>>> values,
>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>>>> works.
>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an American
>>>>>>> thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got too many
>>>>>>> votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong with
>>>>>>> Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many votes."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it just
>>>>>>> keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates, reassign
>>>>>>> their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever got the
>>>>>>> most votes."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method.
>>>>>>>> It's
>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works.
>>>>>>>> Over
>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an average
>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>>>> favor
>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric means
>>>>>>> isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty sure
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though many
>>>>>>>> of his
>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would get him
>>>>>>>> banned
>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes clear
>>>>>>>> he's
>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal with, and
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing methods.
>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff below".)
>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the plonkage:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I understood it)
>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising failure,
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough enough
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as they know
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method that had
>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions
>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer,
>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.   …though its
>>>>>>>> merit &
>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the
>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t
>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite.
>>>>>>>> They
>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express &
>>>>>>>> fully help
>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me that
>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a burial
>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say that,
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always elects
>>>>>>>> the CW.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>>>> particular,
>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any
>>>>>>>> support from
>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine mutual
>>>>>>>> burial.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it, and
>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and could
>>>>>>>> lead to
>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose and enact
>>>>>>>> Coombs
>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore Coombs'
>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of every
>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy, which
>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy for.
>>>>>>>>  …& his
>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he expressed as
>>>>>>>> a serious
>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next guy, which
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his post
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate not
>>>>>>>> being timid
>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates who
>>>>>>>> propose
>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't". But if
>>>>>>>> so,
>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your joke is
>>>>>>>> off the
>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point, so I
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more reason
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even if
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can count,
>>>>>>>> even if
>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because people are
>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>>>> values,
>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>>>> works.
>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust a
>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for good
>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed (if IRV
>>>>>>>> is to
>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method.
>>>>>>>> It's
>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works.
>>>>>>>> Over
>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>>>> favor
>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the buck
>>>>>>>> category.
>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per candidate,
>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because the
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual DSV"
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed that they
>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that the
>>>>>>>> small
>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will eventually
>>>>>>>> blow up.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't been
>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area switched to
>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections, but you
>>>>>>>> get
>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part because of
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995, where he
>>>>>>>> was being
>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show that he
>>>>>>>> was a
>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You should
>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and that I
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my head
>>>>>>>> bitten
>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then BTR-IRV
>>>>>>>> isn't that
>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of slightly more
>>>>>>>> complexity
>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy resistance and
>>>>>>>> do away
>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in a city
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but also how
>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little inconvenient.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here, so I
>>>>>>>> didn't
>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted in
>>>>>>>> many RCV
>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for poll
>>>>>>>> workers.
>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the easier it
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll workers get
>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for "vaguely makes
>>>>>>>> sense
>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result to keep
>>>>>>>> track
>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods are
>>>>>>>> admittedly
>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on this
>>>>>>>> count.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people transporting
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In both cases
>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a worldwide
>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD card, even
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not for
>>>>>>>> storage
>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which again
>>>>>>>> ties
>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first order
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time IRV
>>>>>>>> sankey
>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious steps
>>>>>>>> aren't
>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why they're
>>>>>>>> there.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good with
>>>>>>>> computers
>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's a limit
>>>>>>>> to how
>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the software
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as they can
>>>>>>>> throw
>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many computers
>>>>>>>> in a
>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that a
>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people have
>>>>>>>> given up
>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may prefer to
>>>>>>>> do away
>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language models call
>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews heavily
>>>>>>>> "math
>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer literate", and
>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have a hard
>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept that "if
>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not be
>>>>>>>> elected".
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a problem,
>>>>>>>> then that
>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that summability and
>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real time) is
>>>>>>>> a big
>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election night)
>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the precincts
>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took the
>>>>>>>> lead over
>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the elections desk
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit
>>>>>>>> polling
>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I fear
>>>>>>>> we're
>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't understand
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco since 2011
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't
>>>>>>>> surprise me
>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if you're
>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought to do
>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how Australia does
>>>>>>>> it?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more like
>>>>>>>> largest
>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting is
>>>>>>>> becoming
>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank the
>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between the
>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up the
>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical expected
>>>>>>>> pairwise
>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of getting into
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I think
>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the election is
>>>>>>>> going to
>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I don't
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.  The
>>>>>>>> topic
>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people truly
>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the founders of
>>>>>>>> FairVote
>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that FairVote
>>>>>>>> will get
>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so that they
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should do
>>>>>>>> better,
>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ, but his
>>>>>>>> match
>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is this
>>>>>>>> region
>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X because of
>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple rules
>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the strength
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about how X's
>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some issue that
>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is looking
>>>>>>>> slim
>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest. Who
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either being
>>>>>>>> shored up
>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although indecisive
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know of any
>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would have to
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could alter
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in the
>>>>>>>> von
>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular rating
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have strengths of
>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose between.
>>>>>>>> So
>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what others are
>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is A>B>C,
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify strength of
>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think that
>>>>>>>> getting B
>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and a 60%
>>>>>>>> of C.
>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of the one
>>>>>>>> for A
>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero and A
>>>>>>>> is 10,
>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as getting
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your strength
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of them. So
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of preference
>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent with
>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free variables -
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are still
>>>>>>>> multiple
>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works by
>>>>>>>> approving
>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale, then
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite candidate
>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now there is
>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean utility)
>>>>>>>> Approval,
>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure deal over
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The point
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
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