[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Garman]

To be clear, I am by no means a believer that IRV is the only reform worth
pursuing, or that it’s anywhere close to the perfect system.

Where Michael and I disagree is on the role of pragmatism. I believe that
any time an alternative to plurality voting is on the ballot, voters should
support it. I think the folks in Eugene, Oregon, should vote yes on STAR. I
think more places should try out approval. Beyond those three, I read this
list because I enjoy learning about completely new and different systems
that would be fascinating to see in practice somewhere one day. But in a
place where citizens are asked for an up or down vote on IRV vs. FPTP, I
don’t see how you can defend voting for the worst possible system because
the proposed reform isn’t exactly what you’d like.
On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 9:38 AM Michael Garman <
michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:

> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of evidence for
> your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you prove that
> there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>
> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify opposing a
> reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward. Your ideal system
> isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t call yourself a reformer and
> encourage people to vote against reform.
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior system,
>>> because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting exactly
>>> what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
>>> Shame on you.
>>>
>>
>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>
>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what they’re
>> getting when they enact it.
>>
>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about what it is
>> & will do.
>>
>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty. But no,
>> not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>
>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>
>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if voters
>>>> know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against that
>>>> hope.
>>>>
>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments based on an
>>>> intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t be expected
>>>> to trust that it will work.
>>>>
>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject “RCV”.
>>>>
>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>
>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local elections.
>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>> values,
>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you could
>>>>>> go
>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>> works.
>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an American
>>>>> thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some kind
>>>>> of verifiable voting.
>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even educated,
>>>>> high-information voters don't care about details and won't understand
>>>>> them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your system. The
>>>>> educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're the ones on
>>>>> all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda, etc. These
>>>>> people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and should) hand-wave
>>>>> and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point across.
>>>>>
>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the educated
>>>>> voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is ranked
>>>>> higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get elected. If
>>>>> nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the matchups that
>>>>> are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an election
>>>>> because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should win.
>>>>> That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got too many
>>>>> votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong with
>>>>> Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many votes."
>>>>>
>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what "closest
>>>>> to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I gave with
>>>>> minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be a
>>>>> >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>
>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it just keeps
>>>>> getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates, reassign their
>>>>> votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever got the most
>>>>> votes."
>>>>>
>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method. It's
>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works. Over
>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an average
>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so there's
>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>> favor
>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>
>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric means
>>>>> isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty sure
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though many of
>>>>>> his
>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would get him
>>>>>> banned
>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes clear
>>>>>> he's
>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal with, and
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing methods.
>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff below".)
>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the plonkage:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I understood it)
>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising failure, any
>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough enough
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as they know of
>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method that had
>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid triggering
>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions
>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer,
>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.   …though its
>>>>>> merit &
>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the
>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t
>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite.
>>>>>> They
>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully
>>>>>> help
>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me that using
>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a burial
>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say that,
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always elects
>>>>>> the CW.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>> particular,
>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any support
>>>>>> from
>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine mutual burial.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it, and
>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and could lead
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy. In
>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose and enact
>>>>>> Coombs
>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore Coombs'
>>>>>> burial
>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > …
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the postings-page,
>>>>>> & send
>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > …
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of every
>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy, which has
>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy for.
>>>>>>  …& his
>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he expressed as a
>>>>>> serious
>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next guy, which
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his post that
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate not
>>>>>> being timid
>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates who
>>>>>> propose
>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't". But if so,
>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your joke is off
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point, so I
>>>>>> think
>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more reason
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even if they
>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can count,
>>>>>> even if
>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because people are
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the keep
>>>>>> values,
>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you could
>>>>>> go
>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how Meek
>>>>>> works.
>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a method
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust a
>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for good
>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed (if IRV is
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment method.
>>>>>> It's
>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it works. Over
>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles top-up
>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an average
>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>> there's
>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally I'd
>>>>>> favor
>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the buck
>>>>>> category.
>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per candidate,
>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because the other
>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual DSV" and
>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed that they
>>>>>> have
>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that the small
>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will eventually
>>>>>> blow up.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't been used
>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area switched to
>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections, but you
>>>>>> get
>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part because of a
>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995, where he was
>>>>>> being
>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show that he
>>>>>> was a
>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You should
>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and that I
>>>>>> would
>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my head
>>>>>> bitten
>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then BTR-IRV
>>>>>> isn't that
>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of slightly more
>>>>>> complexity
>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy resistance and
>>>>>> do away
>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in a city
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on election
>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but also how
>>>>>> much
>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little inconvenient.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here, so I
>>>>>> didn't
>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted in many
>>>>>> RCV
>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for poll
>>>>>> workers.
>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the easier it
>>>>>> would
>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll workers get
>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for "vaguely makes
>>>>>> sense
>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result to keep
>>>>>> track
>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods are
>>>>>> admittedly
>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on this
>>>>>> count.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people transporting
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In both cases
>>>>>> it's
>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a worldwide
>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD card, even
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not for storage
>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which again ties
>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first order to
>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time IRV sankey
>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious steps
>>>>>> aren't
>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why they're there.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good with
>>>>>> computers
>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's a limit
>>>>>> to how
>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the software
>>>>>> for
>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as they can
>>>>>> throw
>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many computers in
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that a
>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people have given
>>>>>> up
>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot overlords
>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may prefer to do
>>>>>> away
>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language models call
>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews heavily "math
>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer literate", and I
>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have a hard
>>>>>> time
>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>> <
>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>> >
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept that "if
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not be
>>>>>> elected".
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a problem,
>>>>>> then that
>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that summability and
>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real time) is a
>>>>>> big
>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election night) to
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the precincts
>>>>>> on the
>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took the lead
>>>>>> over
>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the elections desk to
>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit polling
>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I fear
>>>>>> we're
>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't understand
>>>>>> what
>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco since 2011
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't surprise
>>>>>> me
>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if you're
>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought to do it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how Australia does it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more like
>>>>>> largest
>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting is
>>>>>> becoming
>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank the
>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between the two
>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up the
>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical expected
>>>>>> pairwise
>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of getting into
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I think it's
>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the election is
>>>>>> going to
>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I don't
>>>>>> think
>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.  The
>>>>>> topic
>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>> <
>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people truly
>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the founders of
>>>>>> FairVote
>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that FairVote will
>>>>>> get
>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so that they
>>>>>> will
>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should do
>>>>>> better,
>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ, but his
>>>>>> match
>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is this
>>>>>> region
>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X because of
>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple rules
>>>>>> could
>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the strength of
>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about how X's
>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some issue that
>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is looking
>>>>>> slim
>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest. Who the
>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either being shored
>>>>>> up
>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although indecisive and
>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know of any
>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would have to
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could alter the
>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an unpredictable mess.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in the von
>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular rating
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have strengths of
>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose between.
>>>>>> So
>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what others are
>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is A>B>C, you
>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify strength of
>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think that
>>>>>> getting B
>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and a 60% of
>>>>>> C.
>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of the one for
>>>>>> A
>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero and A is
>>>>>> 10,
>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as getting a
>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your strength
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of them. So
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of preference
>>>>>> really
>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent with these
>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free variables -
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are still
>>>>>> multiple
>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works by
>>>>>> approving
>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale, then
>>>>>> there
>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite candidate to
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now there is
>>>>>> only
>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean utility)
>>>>>> Approval,
>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure deal over a
>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The point is
>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -km
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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