[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Toby Pereira]

 I don't think Approval strategy is overly burdensome. As an honest voter, you just pick your least favourite candidate to approve, so one decision. Approval has advantages outside the usual criterion compliance as well. The results of an approval election are easily published and digested, as with a FPTP election. It's simply a list of votes (approvals) for each candidate. I think this is worth more than it gets credit for. In a Condorcet election, how would the result be published? Every head-to-head separately? Also in a debate versus FPTP, approval is the only method that has no real disadvantages relative to FPTP. FPTP proponents can always fall back on saying their method is simple, much simpler than the proposed alternatives. Well, approval is essentially the same level of simplicity. FPTP passes the rarely passed participation criterion, which approval also does. FPTP proponents don't really have anywhere to go, except to make the spurious claim that approval violates one person, one vote. But this is easily countered.
Toby
    On Sunday, 17 March 2024 at 11:28:08 GMT, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:  
 
 
As for Approval, my position hasn't really changed: it is able to pass 
so many criteria by offloading the burden of voting onto the voter 
himself and by classifying a large swath of different ballots as all 
"honest" (in the rank-consistent sense). Not only strategic voters have 
to play the strategy game, but honest voters too[1]: just determining 
which honest vote to submit requires strategy! With ranking, on the 
other hand, it's easy: there's only one rank-consistent honest ballot, 
so if you don't want to play the game, just submit that ballot. No 
manual DSV needed.

(See also Forest's explanation of my point at 
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000717.html.)

-km


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