[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2024-03-16 23:57, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 03/16/2024 5:52 PM EDT Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

>> …& don’t forget that Condorcet, too, has a very
>> computationally-intensive & computationally-demanding count,
> 
> We talked about this before, Michael, when I posted.  Because of
> Precinct Summability and the decentralization of the tabulation (that
> does *not* exist with Hare IRV), there is *no* practical bottleneck
> of computational burden (like there is with Hare IRV that first
> requires the centralization of all individual ballot data).
>> with the consequent loss of transparency, & difficulty of security-auditing for count-fraud.
> 
> Nope, that's a falsehood.  Condorcet is Precinct Summable and those
> tallies add up and the original tallies come right outa the same machine
> that the ballots go into, just like FPTP.  There are no intermediate
> steps that are opaque.  It's not at all the same problem as with Hare RCV.

I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts, but I would like to add 
this:

- If a lack of summability is not a problem, then BTR-IRV isn't that 
much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of slightly more complexity 
than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy resistance and do away 
with most of its exit incentive.

If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious steps aren't any 
problem, as long as the public understands why they're there. BTR-IRV's 
safeguarding step follows directly from your concept that "if more 
people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not be elected".

- If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a problem, then that 
disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.

It would seem to me that the only reason one would accept IRV and reject 
Condorcet-IRV would be if there's a manual count and the initial O(n^2) 
Condorcet matrix calculation is considered too laborious. Or for 
marketing reasons.

As for Approval, my position hasn't really changed: it is able to pass 
so many criteria by offloading the burden of voting onto the voter 
himself and by classifying a large swath of different ballots as all 
"honest" (in the rank-consistent sense). Not only strategic voters have 
to play the strategy game, but honest voters too[1]: just determining 
which honest vote to submit requires strategy! With ranking, on the 
other hand, it's easy: there's only one rank-consistent honest ballot, 
so if you don't want to play the game, just submit that ballot. No 
manual DSV needed.

(See also Forest's explanation of my point at 
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000717.html.)

-km

[1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern sense.