[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

I’ve told my arguments for Approval as best proposal. Different
reform-advocates prefer different proposals.

I claim that any proposal to a city-council, state legislature, etc. should
offer several methods.

Approval because of its many unique advantages that I’ve stated:

RP(wv) & MinMax(wv), in case rank-balloting is insisted-on.

Score if you believe that it’s better or more winnable.

My proposal would only include Approval & those 2 wv methods.

…& likewise, if initiative is necessary, that variety of methods should be
offered to focus-groups, to guide the choice of method for the initiative.

Approval’s unique advantages:

1. Absolute minimalness.

2. Consequent unique unarbitrariness.

3. Uniquely brief definition & easy description, proposal, enactability,
implementation, administration & security-audit.

It’s easy to underestimate the importance of Approval’s easy implementation.

Unlike Score or any other proposal, Approval can y implementated with no
new balloting equipment & not even any modification of software for
balloting & count.

It’s easy to underestimate the importance of simple count & security-audit.

Score isn’t as simple. It needs a whole new kind of balloting,
very-questionably feasible without new balloting equipment.

It undeniably requires special new count-software.

Don’t underestimate count-fraud. It may well be what prevents any method
from working. How good the method is, is irrelevant when count-fraud is
successfully used.

With the above-listed problems for Score & ranked methods, the matter of
voters’ qualification to use Approval well is the least of our concerns.

“Many’s the slip twixt the cup & the lip.”


On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 16:34 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> For me, personally, I'd probably minmax with range voting. But I don't
> think score is any more complicated than approval voting, and Warren D.
> Smith argues (IMO convincingly) that Score is more likely to stick in the
> long run because it reduces the number of voters who bullet vote, which deals
> with one common concern, and because it's more popular with third parties
> because of the nursery effect. (STAR is even better for this, since it
> makes bullet voting less attractive strategically and appeals to people who
> like IRV'S runoff.)
>
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:54 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> Date: Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:52
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
>> To: robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com>
>>
>>
>> Who knows. I hope Progressives don’t. In public political elections with
>> Score, all-or-nothing rating is optimal, & I’d advise Progressives to rate
>> all-or-nothing.
>>
>> The legitimate use for Score’s partial ratings would be only for when
>> it’s genuinely uncertain whether or not a candidate should get an approval.
>>
>> That’s Score’s luxury-convenience.
>>
>> But I don’t want it. In Approval, you can give a probabilistic partial
>> approval when it’s uncertain whether a candidate rates approval:
>>
>> Flip a coin, to give hir 50% probability of approval. Or draw one of 3
>> numbers from a bag , for a 1/3 approval-probability.
>>
>> Or number 10 paper squares of paper from 0 to 9, & twice draw one from
>> the bag (with replacement), to write a 2-digit number from 0 to 99.  …in
>> order to approve the candidate with any desired probability from 1% to 99%.
>>
>> But don’t complicate & elaborate the method, don’t lose Approval’s
>> absolute minimalness & unique complete unarbitrariness, because you don’t
>> want to do something for yourself.
>>
>> Don’t lose Approval’s uniquely easy proposal, implementation,
>> administration & security-auditing because you want Score to do partial
>> rating for you.
>>
>> At EM, Robert recently made the same comment that he made here. I
>> answered it there.  …a long & thorough answer.
>>
>> In the current poll, everyone participating, including me, is rating
>> sincerely in the Score ballotings because there’s no reason not to. Nothing
>> is at stake.
>>
>> We have a rank-balloting, to be counted by RP(wv), to, strategy-free,
>> show the CW.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 22:07 robert bristow-johnson <
>> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
>>> scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of candidates.
>>> That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still accounts
>>> for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
>>> >
>>>
>>> Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political election
>>> where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail politically, and
>>> vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots honestly about
>>> intensity of preference?
>>>
>>> "My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>
>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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