[EM] Possible resistant set cloneproofing template

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2024-02-19 18:13, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Here's a cloneproofing idea I had. I'm basically just trying to 
> generalize the IRV approach as much as possible to see if I can get a 
> hang of how to do cloneproofing in a more general sense.
> 
> Suppose we have two elections, call them e_A and e_AC, before and after 
> cloning A. Also suppose that we have two associated social orders (p_A, 
> p_AC), that are equal except that the clones are ranked next to each other.
> 
> E.g. p_A might be B>A>C, and then after cloning A into A1, A2, A3, p_AC 
> is B>A1_A2>A3>C.
> 
> Now consider the following method: repeatedly eliminate the lowest 
> ranking remaining candidate, according to the social ordering, who does 
> not disqualify someone else according to the remaining sub-elections.

I now think that my claim that this is monotone if the social ordering 
is provided by a method that passes strong monotonicity - is wrong.

Closed: if that's right, then what I said in my mail to you about how 
this could be used with Range to get monotonicity is also wrong. Clone 
independence might still be preserved, though; I haven't checked.

More to come once I've investigated further.

-km