[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Toby Pereira]

 So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": "You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."
It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.
And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.
Toby
    On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:  
 
 I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/

Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods,  Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
        election-methods at lists.electorama.com

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
        http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com

or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
        election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com

You can reach the person managing the list at
        election-methods-owner at lists.electorama.com

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."


Today's Topics:

   1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
   2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
From: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
        <CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=UXH6V3CYg at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
Germany.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240228/3bb08c49/attachment-0001.htm>

------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
Message-ID:
        <CAOKDY5DX=s7TsxiX5ir1eM=PG2y1176YVEs_L0L=pJ3+V_CDRQ at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.

It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s
participation-failure, a pass.

I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.

But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that
single-winner elections aren?t perfect.  ?making a good argument for
PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.

Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.

We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the world?s
countries for about a century.

But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
> Germany.
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240228/20e515a6/attachment-0001.htm>

------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

_______________________________________________
Election-Methods mailing list
Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com


------------------------------

End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 235, Issue 41
*************************************************

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
  
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240301/e7146f5e/attachment-0001.htm>