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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": <span>"You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>Toby</span></div><div><br></div>
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On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote:
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<div><div id="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266"><div dir="ltr"><div>I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:</div><div><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.</div><div><br></div><div>I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).</div><div><br></div><br><div class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_attr">On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex;" class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_quote">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
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1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)<br>
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)<br>
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Message: 1<br>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800<br>
From: Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=<a href="mailto:UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods<br>
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable<br>
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in<br>
Germany.<br>
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Message: 2<br>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800<br>
From: Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>><br>
Cc: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAOKDY5DX=s7TsxiX5ir1eM=PG2y1176YVEs_L0L=<a href="mailto:pJ3%2BV_CDRQ@mail.gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">pJ3+V_CDRQ@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
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It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in<br>
Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.<br>
<br>
It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.<br>
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s<br>
participation-failure, a pass.<br>
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I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually<br>
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for<br>
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy<br>
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably<br>
irrelevant to strategy.<br>
<br>
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that<br>
single-winner elections aren?t perfect. ?making a good argument for<br>
PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.<br>
<br>
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany feels<br>
no need to compromise participation.<br>
<br>
We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the world?s<br>
countries for about a century.<br>
<br>
But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck in<br>
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to<br>
democracy.<br>
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On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <<br>
<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods<br>
> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable<br>
> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in<br>
> Germany.<br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list<br>
> info<br>
><br>
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