[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Closed Limelike Curves]

> I assumed you were talking about median rating or something like that.
>
Yeah, that would be one possible guess. (Linear medians also might work).

The outcomes of our election methods can (almost as a rule) be dictated by a
> coordinated majority (or a group of more numerous voters) so I expect a
> "zero-info
> honesty" method to have some kind of inherent tether to this reality, as
> though the
> coordination is done for the voters already, behind the scenes.

Well, the two examples of proven zero-information honesty I know about are
quadratic voting and Borda count. I'm not actually aware of any proofs for
the Condorcet cases, but I suspect  most Condorcet methods work here.

Later-no-help is incompatible with Condorcet, so I'm not sure if those
methods can stand up to fully-informed voting.

On Wed, Jun 19, 2024 at 3:12 AM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:

> Hi CLC,
>
> Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> a écrit :
> >>> This is why I previously suggested that, ideally, a system should
> satisfy both
> >>> zero-info honesty and LNHe+FBC. This seems like the maximally-honest
> combination
> >>> of properties, because it handles low-information elections honestly,
> and
> >>> high-information elections "as sincerely as possible" (i.e. no
> order-reversal,
> >>> which is enough to guarantee the Condorcet winner is visible from the
> ballots).
> >
> >> I am curious what your definition of "visible from the ballots" is.
> It's possible
> >> to generate scenarios where the sincere CW is one of two frontrunners
> and yet still
> >> loses under practically all methods, because they lose necessary
> support (from
> >> truncation) from supporters of the other frontrunner while most of the
> CW's
> >> supporters actually prefer a different candidate to the CW.
> >
> > Am I missing something about the CW under approval? I was under the
> impression that,
> > if everyone is following the polls and knows everyone else's voting
> intentions, the
> > majority-preferred candidate will win because people will adjust their
> approval
> > threshold until the CW is the only candidate with >50% approval.
>
> If the polls are accurate I think that theory could work. What I'm saying
> is that if
> two frontrunners are chosen arbitrarily, but one of them is the CW, that
> isn't a
> sufficient condition for the CW to win.
>
> Here's a contrived example, starting with the sincere preferences:
> 38: Yellow>Blue>Red
> 37: Red>Blue>Yellow
> 15: Blue>Red>Yellow
> 7: Yellow>Red>Blue
> 2: Red>Yellow>Blue
> 1: Blue>Yellow>Red
>
> Blue is sincere CW, and Yellow is the best opposition to Blue (barely).
> With Blue
> and Yellow as perceived frontrunners, these ballots are possible
> (truncating midway
> between frontrunners):
> 45: Yellow
> 37: Red>Blue
> 15: Blue>Red
> 2: Red>Yellow
> 1: Blue
>
> This returns Red as the voted CW and implicit approval winner.
>
> Since Blue and Red both end up with majority approval, it's possible you
> will say
> that the polls shouldn't have ended up with a Blue/Yellow match-up, but a
> Blue/Red
> one. By my math (here omitted) that would give Blue majority approval and
> uniquely
> so. (Interestingly Blue would not be the voted CW; Yellow would always have
> sub-majority wins over the other two.) An odd thing about this outcome is
> that
> Blue/Red look like they are from the same party and the 45% who favor
> Yellow don't
> bullet vote at all. That makes me skeptical that a Blue/Red match-up would
> actually
> happen in such a clean way.
>
> >>> I think the best hope for a system that formally satisfies both
> criteria is
> >>> probably somewhere in the generalized median family of voting methods.
> >>
> >> That would surprise me, but who knows.
> >
> > Huh, why would it surprise you?
>
> I assumed you were talking about median rating or something like that.
>
> The outcomes of our election methods can (almost as a rule) be dictated by
> a
> coordinated majority (or a group of more numerous voters) so I expect a
> "zero-info
> honesty" method to have some kind of inherent tether to this reality, as
> though the
> coordination is done for the voters already, behind the scenes.
>
> Kevin
> votingmethods.net
>
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